



study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not “election crimes,” even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Last, violations of ethical provisions and the Hatch Act are not “election crimes.” Similarly, civil or other wrongs that do not rise to the level of criminal activity (i.e., a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony) are not “election crimes.”

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”) and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were ~~certainly~~ limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations ~~discovered~~ in the literature review.

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Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With "MyVote1" Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and "monitor field reports" from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public



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Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- o Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- o Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

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Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.

Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud

~~Because~~ absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide

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recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the “ease of commission” and the impact of the fraud.

Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, ~~the~~ EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

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Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, ~~the~~ EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

be Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.



Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

The Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state's chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.



In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states' chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.



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Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures

Once a reliable ^{2w} data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, ~~a real~~ analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available ~~to the~~ effort.

CONCLUSION ^{for the}

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.



APPENDIX 1 – BIOGRAPHIES OF JOB SEREBROV AND TOVA WANG

Available on EAC Website, www.eac.gov.

APPENDIX 2 – SUMMARIES OF BOOKS, REPORTS AND ARTICLES

Available on EAC Website, www.eac.gov.

APPENDIX 3 – SUMMARIES OF INTERVIEWS

Available on EAC Website, www.eac.gov.

APPENDIX 4 – SUMMARIES OF CASES REVIEWED

Available on EAC Website, www.eac.gov.

FRAUD &
INTIMIDATION
REPORT
FILE

Interview with Craig Donsanto, Director, Elections Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice
January 13, 2006

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Election Crimes Branch is responsible for supervising federal criminal investigations and prosecutions of election crimes.

Questions

How are Prosecution Decisions Made?

Craig Donsanto must approve all investigations that go beyond a preliminary stage, all charges, search warrant applications and subpoenas and all prosecutions. The decision to investigate is very sensitive because of the public officials involved. If a charge seems political, Donsanto will reject it. Donsanto gives possible theories for investigation. Donsanto and Noel Hillman will decide whether to farm out the case to an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA). Donsanto uses a concept called predication. In-other-words, there must be enough evidence to suggest a crime has been committed. The method of evaluation of this evidence depends on the type of evidence and its source. There are two types of evidence---factual (antisocial behavior) and legal (antisocial behavior leading to statutory violations). Whether an indictment will be brought depends on the likelihood of success before a jury. Much depends on the type of evidence and the source. Donsanto said he "knows it when he sees it." Donsanto will only indict if he is confident of a conviction assuming the worst case scenario - a jury trial.

A person under investigation will first receive a target letter. Often, a defendant who gets a target letter will ask for a departmental hearing. The defendant's case will be heard by Donsanto and Hillman. On occasion, the assistant attorney general will review the case. ~~The department grants such hearings easily because such defendants are likely to provide information about others involved.~~

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The Civil Rights Division, Voting Rights Section makes its own decisions on prosecution. The head of that division is John Tanner. There is a lot of cooperation between the Voting Section and the Election Crimes Branch.

Does the Decision to Prosecute Incorporate Particular Political Considerations within a State Such as a One Party System or a System in which the Party in Power Controls the Means of Prosecution and Suppresses Opposition Complaints?

Yes. Before, the department would leave it to the states. Now, if there is racial animus involved in the case, there is political bias involved, or the prosecutor is not impartial, the department will take it over.

Does it Matter if the Complaint Comes from a Member of a Racial Minority?

No. But if the question involves racial animus, that has also always been an aggravating factor, making it more likely the Department will take it over

What Kinds of Complaints Would Routinely Override Principles of Federalism?

Federalism is no longer big issue. DOJ is permitted to prosecute whenever there is a candidate for federal office on the ballot.

Are There Too Few Prosecutions?

DOJ can't prosecute everything.

What Should Be Done to Improve the System?

The problem is asserting federal jurisdiction in non-federal elections. It is preferable for the federal government to pursue these cases for the following reasons: federal districts draw from a bigger and more diverse jury pool; the DOJ is politically detached; local district attorneys are hamstrung by the need to be re-elected; DOJ has more resources – local prosecutors need to focus on personal and property crimes---fraud cases are too big and too complex for them; DOJ can use the grand jury process as a discovery technique and to test the strength of the case.

In *U.S. v. McNally*, the court ruled that the mail fraud statute does not apply to election fraud. It was through the mail fraud statute that the department had routinely gotten federal jurisdiction over election fraud cases. 18 USC 1346, the congressional effort to “fix” *McNally*, did not include voter fraud.

As a result, the department needs a new federal law that allows federal prosecution whenever a federal instrumentality is used, e.g. the mail, federal funding, interstate commerce. The department has drafted such legislation, which was introduced but not passed in the early 1990s. A federal law is needed that permits prosecution in any election where any federal instrumentality is used.

Other Information

The Department has held four symposia for District Election Officers (DEOs) and FBI agents since the initiation of the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative. In 2003, civil rights leaders were invited to make speeches, but were not permitted to take part in the rest of the symposium. All other symposia have been closed to the public. ~~(Peg will be sending us the complete training materials used at those sessions. These are confidential and are the subject of FOIA litigation).~~

There are two types of attorneys in the division: prosecutors, who take on cases when the jurisdiction of the section requires it; the US Attorney has recused him or herself; or when the US Attorney is unable to handle the case (most frequent reason) and braintrust attorneys who analyze the facts, formulate theories, and draft legal documents.

Cases:

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Donsanto provided us with three case lists: Open cases (still being investigated) as of January 13, 2006 – confidential; election fraud prosecutions and convictions as a result of the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative October 2002-January 13, 2006; and cases closed for lack of evidence as of January 13, 2006.

~~If we want more documents related to any case, we must get those documents from the states. The department will not release them to us.~~

Do they care about this?

Although the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate complaints of fraud, *the number of cases that the department is investigating and the number of indictments the department is pursuing are both up dramatically.*

Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters, and double voters than ever before. Previously, cases were only brought against conspiracies when there was a pattern or scheme to corrupt the process rather than individual offenders acting alone. For deterrence purposes, ~~charges were not brought against individuals – these cases went un-prosecuted.~~ This change in direction, focus, and level of aggression was by the decision of the Attorney General. The reason for the change was for deterrence purposes. he Attorney General decided to add the pursuit of individuals who vote when not eligible to vote (noncitizens, felons) or who vote more than once.

how is this different?

The department is currently undertaking three pilot projects to determine what works in developing the cases and obtaining convictions and what works with juries in such matters to gain convictions:

1. Felon voters in Milwaukee.
2. Alien voters in the Southern District of Florida. FYI – under 18 USC 611, to prosecute for “alien voting” there is no intent requirement. Conviction can lead to deportation. Nonetheless, the department feels compelled to look at mitigating factors such as was the alien told it was OK to vote, does the alien have a spouse that is a citizen.
3. Double voters in a variety of jurisdictions.

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The department does not maintain records of the complaints that come in from DEOs, U.S attorneys and others during the election that are not pursued by the department. Donsanto asserted that U.S. attorneys never initiate frivolous investigations.

~~According to the new handbook, the department can take on a case whenever there is a federal candidate on the ballot~~

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**Interview with John Tanner, Director~~Chief~~, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Department of Justice**

February 24, 2006

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Voting Section is charged with the civil enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), and Title III of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).

Note: Mr. Tanner's reluctance to share data, information and his perspective on solving the problems presented an obstacle to conducting the type of interview that would help inform this project as much as we would have hoped. Mr. Tanner would not give us any information about or data from the section's election complaint intake phone logs; data or even general information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system its formal process for tracking and managing work activities in pursuing complaints and potential violations of the voting laws; and would give us only a selected few samples of attorney observer reports, reports that every Voting Section attorney who is observing elections at poll sites on Election Day is required to submit. He would not discuss in any manner any current investigations or cases the section is involved in. He also did not believe it was his position to offer us recommendations as to how his office, elections, or the voting process might be improved.

Authority and Process

The Voting Section, in contrast to the Public Integrity Section as Craig Donsanto described it, typically focuses looks only onat systemic problems resulting from government action or inaction, not problems caused by individuals. Indeed, the section never goes after individuals because it does not have the statutory authority to do so. In situations in which individuals are causing problems at the polls and interfering with voting rights, the section calls the local election officials to resolve it.

Federal voting laws enforced by the section only apply to state action, so the section only sues state and local governments – it does not have any enforcement power over individuals. Most often, the section enters into consent agreements with governments that focus on poll worker training, takes steps to restructure how polls are run, and deals with problems on Election Day on the spot. Doing it this way has been most effective – for example, while the section used to have the most observers in the South, with systematic changes forced upon those jurisdictions, have made it so now the section now does not get complaints from the South.

The section can get involved even where there is no federal candidate on the ballot if there is a racial issue under the 14th and 15th Amendments.

When the section receives a complaint, attorneys first determine whether it is a matter that involves individual offenders or a systemic problem. When deciding what to do

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with the complaint, the section errs on the side of referring it criminally to avoid having any because they do not want civil litigation to complicate a possible criminal case.

When a complaint comes in, the attorneys ask questions to see if there are even problems there that the complainant is not aware are violations of the law. For example, in the Boston case, the attorney did not just look at Spanish language cases under section 203, but also brought a Section 2 case for violations regarding Chinese and Vietnamese voters. When looking into a case, the attorneys look for specificity, witnesses and supporting evidence.

Often, lawsuits bring voluntary compliance.

Voter Intimidation

Many instances of what some people refer to as voter intimidation are more unclear now. For example, photographing voters at the polls has been called intimidating, but now everyone is at the polls with a camera. It is hard to know when something is intimidation and it is difficult to show that it was an act of intimidation.

The fact that both parties are engaging in these tactics now makes it more complicated. It makes it difficult to point the finger at any one side.

The inappropriate use of challengers on the basis of race would be a violation of the law. Mr. Tanner was unaware that such allegations were made in Ohio in 2004. He said there had never been a formal investigation into the abusive use of challengers.

Mr. Tanner said a lot of the challenges are legitimate because you have a lot of voter registration fraud as a result of groups paying people to register voters by the form. They turn in bogus registration forms. Then the parties examine the registration forms and challenge them because 200 of them, for example, have addresses of a vacant lot.

However, Mr. Tanner said the Department was able to informally intervene in challenger situations in Florida, Atkinson County, Georgia and in Alabama, as was referenced in a February 23 Op-Ed in USA Today. Mr. Tanner reiterated the section takes racial targeting very seriously.

Refusal to provide provisional ballots would be a violation of the law that the section would investigate.

Deceptive practices are committed by individuals and would be a matter for the Public Integrity Section. Local government would have to be involved for the ~~voting~~ Voting Section to become involved.

Unequal implementation of ID rules, or asking minority voters only for ID would be something the section would go after. Mr. Tanner was unaware of allegations of this in 2004. He said this is usually a problem where you have language minorities and the poll workers cannot understand the voters when they say their names. The section has never

formally investigated or solely focused a case based on abuse of ID provisions. However, implementation of ID rules was part of the Section 2 case in San Diego. Mr. Tanner reiterated that the section is doing more than ever before.

When asked about the section's references to incidents of vote fraud in the documents related to the new state photo identification requirements, Mr. Tanner said the section only looks at retrogression, not at the wisdom of what a legislature does. In Georgia, for example, everyone statistically has identification, and more blacks have ID than whites. With respect to the letter to Senator Kit Bond regarding voter ID, the section did refer to the perception of concern about dead voters because of reporting by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. It is understandable that when you have thousands of bogus registrations that there would be concerns about polling place fraud. Very close elections make this even more of an understandable concern. Putting control of registration lists in the hands of the states will be helpful because at this higher level of government you find a higher level of professionalism.

It is hard to know how much vote suppression and intimidation is taking place because it depends on one's definition of the terms – they are used very loosely by some people. However, the enforcement of federal law over the years has made an astounding difference so that the level of discrimination has plummeted. Registration of minorities has soared, as can be seen on the section's website. Mr. Tanner was unsure if the same was true with respect to turnout, but the gap is less. That information is not on the section's website.

The section is not filing as many Section 2 cases as compared to Section 203 cases because many of the jurisdictions sued under Section 2 in the past do not have issues anymore. Mr. Tanner said that race based problems are rare now.

NVRA has been effective in opening up the registration process. In terms of enforcement, Mr. Tanner said they do what they can when they have credible allegations. There is a big gap between complaints and what can be substantiated. Mr. Tanner stated that given the high quality of the attorneys now in the section, if they do not investigate it or bring action, that act complained of did not happen.

Recommendations

Mr. Tanner did not feel it was appropriate to make recommendations.

Note: We contend that Mr. Tanner's reluctance to share data, information and his perspective on solving the problems presented an obstacle to conducting the type of interview that would help inform this project as much as we would have hoped. We did not have access to any information about or data from the section's election complaint intake phone logs or data or even general information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system-its formal process for tracking and managing work activities in pursuing complaints and potential violations of the voting laws. Only a selected few samples of attorney-observer reports were provided, reports that every Voting Section

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attorney who is observing elections at poll sites on Election Day is required to submit.
Mr. Tanner would not discuss any current investigations or cases the section is involved
in.



U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
1225 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 1100
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

October 19, 2006

The Honorable Rush Holt
1019 Longworth Building
Washington, DC 20515

Via Facsimile Transmission ONLY
202-225-6025

RE: October 16, 2006 Letter

Dear Congressman Holt:

Your letter of October 16, 2006 requests the release of EAC's Voter Fraud and Intimidation Report. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify the purpose and status of this study.


In late 2005, EAC hired two consultants for the purpose of assisting EAC with two things: 1) developing a uniform definition of the phrase voter fraud, and 2) making recommendations on how to further study the existence, prosecution, and means of deterring such voter fraud. In May 2006, a status report on this study was given to the EAC Standards Board and EAC Board of Advisors during their public meetings. During the same week, a working group convened to react to and provide comment on the progress and potential conclusions that could be reached from the work of the two consultants.

The conversation at the working group meeting was lively on the very points that we were trying to accomplish as a part of this study, namely what is voter fraud and how do we pursue studying it. Many of the proposed conclusions that were suggested by the consultants were challenged by the working group members. As such, the consultants were tasked with reviewing the concerns expressed at the working group meeting, conducting additional research as necessary, and providing a draft report to EAC that took into account the working group's concerns and issues.

That draft report is currently being vetted by EAC staff. EAC will release a final report from this study after it has conducted a review of the draft provided by the consultants. However, it is important to remember the purpose of this study -- finding a uniform definition of voter fraud and making recommendations on how to study the existence, prosecution and deterrence of voter fraud -- as it will serve as the basis of the EAC report on this study.

Thank you for your letter. You can be assured that as soon as a final report on the fraud and intimidation study is available, a copy will be made available to the public.

Sincerely,


Paul S. DeGregorio
Chairman

SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

Voter Suppression & Intimidation:

- Voter suppression efforts are sometimes racially based, and sometimes based on partisan considerations
- Hard to know how much vote suppression and intimidation is taking place because it depends on one's definition of the terms – they are used very loosely by some people. Many instances of what some people refer to as voter intimidation are more unclear now (e.g.; photographing voters at the polls has been called intimidating, but now everyone is at the polls with a camera). It is hard to know when something is intimidation and it is difficult to show that it was an act of intimidation
- The fact that both parties are engaging in these tactics now makes it more complicated. It makes it difficult to point the finger at any one side.
- Some advocates assert that, given the additional resources and latitude given to the DOJ enforcement of acts such as double voting and noncitizen voting, there should be an equal commitment to enforcement of acts of intimidation and suppression cases.
- Examples:
 - spreading of false information, such as phone calls, flyers, and radio ads that intentionally mislead as to voting procedures, such as claiming that if you do not have identification, you cannot vote, and providing false dates for the election
 - Observers with cameras, which people associate with potential political retribution or even violence
 - Intimidating police presence at the polls
 - open hostility by poll workers toward minorities (racial and language), or poll workers asking intimidating questions;
 - groups of officious-looking poll watchers at the poll sites who seem to be some sort of authority looking for wrongdoing;
 - challenges
 - There are cases where challenger laws have been beneficial and where they have been abused (Brennan is currently working on developing a model challenger law)
 - No way to determine whether a challenge is in good or bad faith, and there is little penalty for making a bad faith challenge. The fact that there are no checks on the challenges at the precinct level, or even a requirement of concurrence from an opposing party challenger leads to the concern that challenge process will be abused. The voter on the other hand, will need to get majority approval of county election board members to defeat the challenge.
 - Especially in jurisdictions that authorize challenges, the use of challenge lists and challengers goes beyond partisanship to racial suppression and intimidation
 - instances where civic groups and church groups intimidate members to vote in a specific manner, not for reward, but under threat of being ostracized or even telling them they will go to hell.(AR, KY)
 - moving poll sites
 - having Indians vote at polling places staffed by non-Indians often results in incidents of disrespect towards Native voters, judges aren't familiar with Indian last names and are more dismissive of solving discrepancies with native voters
 - intimidation at the poll sites in court houses. Many voters are afraid of the county judges or county employees and therefore will not vote. They justifiably believe their ballots will be opened by these employees to see who they voted for, and if they voted against the county people, retribution might ensue. (AR)

Fraud in Voting:

NOTE: Many interviewees appear to have made claims regarding the quantity and type of voting fraud based on incomplete data, their personal experience, or their impressions (e.g.; voting fraud

SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

has been confined to absentee ballots; there is no in person assumption of others' voter identities to vote).

- The most commonly cited example of voting fraud mentioned was absentee ballot fraud (e.g.; vote selling involving absentee ballots, the filling out of absentee ballots en masse, people at nursing homes filling out the ballots of residents, and union leaders getting members to vote a certain way by absentee ballot).
- Many assert that impersonation, or polling place fraud, is probably the least frequent type because:
 - impersonation fraud is more likely to be caught and is therefore not worth the risk
 - unlike in an absentee situation, actual poll workers are present to disrupt impersonation fraud, for instance, by catching the same individual voting twice
 - if one votes in the name of another voter, and that voter shows up at the polls, the fraud will be discovered
 - one half to one quarter of the time the person will be caught (there is a chance the pollworker will have personal knowledge of the person, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox has mentioned that there are many opportunities for discovery of in person fraud as well).
 - deterrent is that it's a felony, and that one person voting twice is not an effective way to influence an election. One would need to get a lot of people involved for it to work
- Vote buying still occurs and, in some cases, it is hard to distinguish between intimidation and vote buying.
- Tampering with ballots in transit between poll and election office is a concern (AR)

Voter Registration:

- Some assert that registration fraud is the major issue (esp unsupervised voter registration drives by political parties and advocacy groups that pay workers to register voters)
- Some assert that various groups abuse the existence of list deadwood to make claims about fraudulent voting.
- Some assert that when compiling such lists and doing comparisons, which are used as the basis for challenges, sound statistical methods must be utilized, and often are not. Matching protocols without faulty assumptions will have a 4 percent to 35 percent error rate—that's simply the nature of database work. Private industry has been working on improving this for years.
- If someone is on a voter list twice, that does not mean that voter has voted twice.
- Many problems will be addressed by the statewide database required under HAVA

Enforcement:

- States vary in their authority to intervene in and track voter intimidation-voter suppression and voting fraud cases (e.g.; in AR, enforcement is the responsibility of counties, in IN it is responsibility of State AG).
- Voter fraud and intimidation is difficult to prove. It is very hard to collect the necessary factual evidence to make a case, and doing so is very labor-intensive
- Some believe that voter suppression matters are not pursued formally because often they involve activities that current law does not reach.
- Only two interviewees assert that current state and federal codes seem sufficient for prosecuting fraud, and are not under-enforced (no need for additional laws).
- Some advocacy groups assert that the government does not engage in a sustained investigation of voter suppression matters or pursue any kind of resolution to them. There is a perception that the Department of Justice has never been very aggressive in pursuing cases of vote suppression, intimidation and fraud, and that choices DOJ has made with respect to where they have brought claims do not seem to be based on any systematic analysis of where the biggest problems are.
- Some advocates point out that, once the election is over, civil litigation becomes moot.

SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

- The development of a pre-election challenge list targeted at minorities (some claim this has never been pursued, yet Mr. Tanner said the DOJ was able to informally intervene in challenger situations in Florida, Atkinson County, Georgia and in Alabama), long lines due to unequal distribution of voting machines based on race, list purges based on race, unequal application of voter ID rules, and refusal to offer a provisional ballot on the basis of race would be VRA violations.
- DOJ asserts there is a big gap between complaints and what can be substantiated
- DOJ Voting Rights Section - Federal Voting Rights Act only applies to state action, so the section only sues State and local governments – it does not have any enforcement power over individuals. Most often, the section enters into consent agreements with governments that focus on poll worker training, takes steps to restructure how polls are run, and deals with problems on Election Day on the spot. When deciding what to do with the complaint, the section errs on the side of referring it criminally because they do not want civil litigation to complicate a possible criminal case
- DOJ Election Crimes Branch – DOJ is permitted to prosecute whenever there is a candidate for federal office, but can't prosecute everything. Deceptive practices that are committed by individuals and would be a matter for the Public Integrity Section; local government would have to be involved for the voting section to become involved. The problem is asserting federal jurisdiction in non-federal elections. (In U.S. v. McNally, the court ruled that the mail fraud statute does not apply to election fraud. It was through the mail fraud statute that the department had routinely gotten federal jurisdiction over election fraud cases. 18 USC 1346, the congressional effort to "fix" McNally, did not include voter fraud.)
- It is preferable for the federal government to pursue these cases for the following reasons:
 - federal districts draw from a bigger and more diverse jury pool;
 - the DOJ is politically detached; local district attorneys are hamstrung by the need to be re-elected;
 - DOJ has more resources – local prosecutors need to focus on personal and property crimes—fraud cases are too big and too complex for them;
 - DOJ can use the grand jury process as a discovery technique and to test the strength of the case.
- Some assert that election crimes are not high on the priority list of either district attorneys or grand juries; therefore, complaints of election crime very rarely are prosecuted or are indicted by the grand jury.
- Political parties have devoted extraordinary resources into 'smoking out' fraudulent voters

Recommendations Re Laws & Procedures:

- It is important to keep clear who the perpetrators of the fraud are and where the fraud occurs because that effects what the remedy should be.
- Support Senator Barak Obama's bill for combating voter harassment and deceptive practices. (Many jurisdictions do not currently have laws prohibiting voter harassment and deceptive practices.)
- Support a new law that allows the DOJ to bring civil actions for suppression that are not race based, for example, deceptive practices or wholesale challenges to voters in jurisdictions that tend to vote heavily for one party.
- Support a new federal law that allows federal prosecution whenever a federal instrumentality is used, e.g. the mail, federal funding, interstate commerce (DOJ has drafted such legislation, which was introduced but not passed in the early 1990s.)
- Put stronger teeth in the voter fraud laws; step up enforcement against fraud and provide stiffer penalties as current penalties make the risk of committing fraud relatively low
- There should be increased resources dedicated to expanded DOJ monitoring efforts. This might be the best use of resources since monitors and observers act as a deterrent to fraud and intimidation.
- Some advocate that all election fraud and intimidation complaints should be referred to the State Attorney General's Office to circumvent the problem of local political prosecutions. The

SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
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- Attorney General should take more responsibility for complaints of fraud because at the local level, politics interferes
- Some advocate greater resources for district attorneys. In addition, during election time, there should be an attorney in the DA's office who is designated to handle election prosecution
 - Would be useful to have recommendations for prosecutors investigating fraudulent activity
 - Better trained poll workers
 - Polling places should be open longer, run more professionally but there needs to be fewer of them so that they are staffed by only the best, most professional people (Voting Centers).
 - Move elections to weekends. This would involve more people acting as poll workers who would be much more careful about what was going on.
 - A day should be given off of work without counting as a vacation day so that better poll workers are available.
 - Early voting at the clerk's office is good because the people there know what they are doing. People would be unlikely to commit fraud at the clerk's office. This should be expanded to other polling places in addition to that of the county clerk.
 - Many assert that the best defense against fraud will be better voter lists.
 - States should be urged to implement statewide voter lists in accordance with the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), the election reform law enacted by Congress in 2002 following the Florida debacle
 - Linking voter registration databases across states may be a way to see if people who are registered twice are in fact voting twice
 - New legislation or regulations are needed to provide clear guidance and standards for generating voter lists and purging voters, otherwise states could wrongfully disenfranchise eligible voters; purging must be done in a manner that uses the best databases, and looks at only the most relevant information
 - The process for preventing ineligible ex-felons from casting ballots needs to be improved
 - statewide registration databases should be linked to social service agency databases
 - Challenge laws need to be reformed, especially ones that allow for pre-election mass challenges with no real basis. There is no one size fits all model for challenger legislation, but some bad models involving hurdles for voters lead to abuse and should be reformed. There should be room for poll workers to challenge fraudulent voters, but not for abuse. (KY has list of defined reasons for which they can challenge a voter, such as residency, and the challengers must also fill out paperwork to conduct a challenge) Last minute challenges should not be permitted
 - False information campaigns should be combated with greater voter education, the media could do more to provide information about what is legal and what is illegal
 - Improve the protective zone around polling places: the further vote suppressers can keep people away from the polls, the better.
 - States should be encouraged to:
 - codify into law uniform and clear published standards for voter registration, challenges, voter ID, poll worker training, use and counting of provisional votes, the distribution of voting equipment and the assignment of official pollworkers among precincts, to ensure adequate and nondiscriminatory access
 - standardize forms
 - modify forms and procedures based on feedback from prosecutors
 - Ensure good security procedures for the tabulation process and more transparency in the vote counting process
 - Conduct post-election audits
 - Many advocate eliminating "no excuse" absentee voting.
 - Some recommend reducing partisanship in election administration, but others are skeptical of the feasibility of this

SUMMARY OF INFO FROM INTERVIEWS
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

- Some strongly recommend requiring voter ID, while others strongly oppose it as a voter suppression tactic, asserting that states should not adopt requirements that voters show identification at the polls, beyond those already required by federal law (requiring that identification be shown only by first time voters who did not show identification when registering.) and that states could use signature comparisons.
- Political parties should monitor the processing of voter registrations and purging of registered by local election authorities on an ongoing basis to ensure the timely processing of registrations and changes, including both newly registered voters and voters who move within a jurisdiction or the state, and the Party should ask state Attorneys General to take action where necessary to force the timely updating of voter lists or to challenge, unlawful purges and other improper list maintenance practices.

Future Study Recommendations:

- Just because there was no prosecution, does not mean there was no vote fraud; very hard to come up with a measure of voter fraud short of prosecution
- EAC should conduct a survey of the general public that asks whether they have committed certain acts or been subjected to any incidents of fraud or intimidation. This would require using a very large sample, and we would need to employ the services of an expert in survey data
- EAC should work with the Census Bureau to have them ask different, additional questions in their Voter Population Surveys
- EAC should talk to private election lawyers

1. Everyone does not define voting fraud and voter intimidation the same way.

In some cases, what may have been honest administrative mistakes or errors due to poor poll worker training are lumped together with genuine voter suppression efforts and labeled as voter intimidation or voting fraud. Examples: (1) many authors consider certain voter suppression tactics to be voter intimidation that do not rise to the definition used in criminal enforcement of election crimes; (2) some charge that a DOJ ballot integrity measure in South Dakota was voter intimidation; and (3) some mistakes made in the maintenance of voter registration lists are labeled as fraud.

2. There seems to be no systematic *nationwide* study that reports all (or most) verified instances of voting fraud and voter intimidation or suppression efforts in a particular election or a particular period in U.S. history.

Some sources focus on certain areas of the country, which can bias the study if these areas are more or less susceptible to fraud and suppression. Some focus on the alleged (but not necessarily verified) misdeeds of one political party or another. Still others focus on unverified allegations reported to a toll-free phone line. In some cases, it is not clear if the incidents were intentional voter suppression or genuine poll worker mistakes (e.g.; not providing provisional ballots or in appropriately asking voters for ID). Minnite's study is as close as they get to a systematic study.

3. There are a number of obstacles to gathering compete data on voting fraud and voter intimidation/suppression nationwide in any election.

Authors often have limited resources (time and money) to collect such information. Investigation and prosecution of voting fraud and voter intimidation or suppression occurs at different levels of government (Federal, state and local). These investigations and prosecutions are not reported to and recorded by a central authority. Some voting fraud is inherently more difficult to identify and to prove than others (e.g.; impersonation of another voter at the polls is more difficult, due to the transient nature of some jurisdictions and the fact that impersonators not identified as a fraud at the polls are hard to identify later, than voter registration, vote buying, and absentee ballot fraud). At least some voting fraud and voter intimidation appears to go unreported and uninvestigated, and some prosecutions are unsuccessful due to local politics and law enforcement affiliations and the lack of sufficient resources at the Federal, state, and local levels to support the labor intensive effort.

4. Most sources seem to agree that voter registration and absentee balloting fraud are the most common forms of voting fraud. Absentee ballot fraud often is accompanied by vote buying or voter coercion. Also frequently alleged were instances of ineligible voters (usually felons, but sometime non-citizens, under aged individuals, or non-residents) that voted. But not all agree that these are the only common forms of fraud.

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Some contend that voting in the name of another at the polling place is common, but that such instances are extremely hard to prove. Most instances of ineligible voters voting were linked to improper voter list maintenance or confusion on the part of local election officials as to state law on felon disenfranchisement.

5. A number of sources have identified numerous instances of attempted voter suppression, but no instances of voter intimidation that could be prosecuted under Federal criminal laws is alleged.

Examples of voter suppression efforts include: (1) phone calls and mailings deliberately directing targeted voters to vote on the wrong day or to go to the wrong polling place, or that provide incorrect and threatening information about the voter qualifications and legal consequences of voting; (2) targeted, inappropriate challenges to voters at the polls or shortly before election day; (3) people posing as law enforcement agents at targeted polling places. When such tactics target minority communities, they may be attacked through civil action by DOJ under Voting Rights Act provisions, but they do not qualify for criminal penalties under Federal voter intimidation law. Currently, there is no Federal election law providing criminal penalties for voter suppression efforts. When the suppression adversely affects a political party, but does not have a racial component, DOJ may be hard pressed to pursue the matter unless other Federal criminal law has been violated (e.g.; suppression of phone banks in New Hampshire).

6. Unsupervised voter registration drives by political parties and advocacy groups are a primary source of fraudulent voter registration applications and missing (perhaps deliberately) voter registration applications.

The practice of paying persons to man voter registration drives (particularly, but not only, when the person is paid by the head) is a frequent source of fraudulent voter registration applications. Partisan drives have resulted in applications from persons of “the wrong party” being held back or destroyed. Therefore, while the applicant believes they have registered, the election official has no record of that registration.

7. Many authors contend that proper implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) will reduce or at least not increase the potential for fraud and voter suppression, but some argue that provisions in these laws increase the likelihood of fraud or voter suppression.

Many argue that proper implementation of the list maintenance and fail-safe voting provisions of the NVRA and HAVA’s requirements for the statewide voter registration list, voter ID for certain first-time voters, and provisional voting will reduce the potential for voting fraud and voter intimidation. Others argue that the list maintenance provisions of NVRA cause “dead wood” to be left on the voter rolls, providing opportunity for fraud, or that HAVA’s voter ID and list matching requirements can be used as voter suppression tactics.

EAC-LESSONS LEARNED FROM LITERATURE RESEARCH
PRELIMINARY VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

- 8. Proper recordkeeping and post-election auditing is an important key to identifying and preventing voting fraud, and for subsequent prosecution of such activities; but is not being done consistently.**
- 9. Poll worker recruitment and training is a key component to combating actions that are perceived as suppressing or intimidating voters.**
- 10. Both sides on election reform debates are using incomplete data to bolster their arguments.**

Margaret Sims /EAC/GOV
10/19/2006 07:04 PM

To Juliet E. Hodgkins/EAC/GOV@EAC, Tamar
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Subject Voter Fraud-Voter Intimidation Draft Report

Attached is a copy of the draft voter fraud-voter intimidation report that combines all of the pieces provided to me by the consultants, except for the voluminous Nexis research and case law charts. Tom wants to get this before the Commissioners ASAP, but I need some other eyes to look it over before we do. Although I've made some formatting changes to provide some consistency in presentation, and corrected a couple of glaring errors, I remain concerned about a number of issues:

- As you know, references to DOJ actions/responses have caused some concern at DOJ. But both consultants are adamantly opposed to EAC making substantive changes to their report. Perhaps using footnotes clearly labeled as EAC footnotes would be a method of addressing this issue?
- There are some recommendations regarding DOJ that we (the consultants and I) were told would not be supported by DOJ, and other references to DOJ, none of which have been reviewed by the department. I think we ought to give Craig Donsanto and John Tanner a chance to provide feedback on each of these sections.
- I am a little concerned about the naming of names, particularly in the section that addresses working group concerns. If we publish it as is, it might end up as fodder for some very negative newspaper articles.
- The report currently uses three different voices: third person, first person singular, first person plural. I think this looks really clumsy. If we are not actually making substantive changes, perhaps we could get away with making the presentation consistent in this regard.
- Because the consultants submitted the report in pieces, they did not include proper sequeways. I don't know if we should leave it as is, or insert them where needed.

Please let me know what you think. If it would help, we can schedule a teleconference. --- Peggy



VF-VI Final Rept-draft 10-19-06.doc

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Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation
Report to the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
on
Preliminary Research & Recommendations

DRAFT
By
Job Serebrov and Tova Wang

016458

**Deliberative Process
Privilege**

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Introduction

Charge Under HAVA

Under the Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (“HAVA”), the United States Election Assistance Commission is charged with developing national statistics on voter fraud and developing methods of deterring and investigating voter fraud. Also, the Commission is charged with developing methods of identifying, deterring, and investigating methods of voter intimidation.

Scope of Project

The Commission employed a bipartisan team of legal consultants, Tova Wang and Job Serebrov to develop a preliminary overview work product to determine the quantity and quality of vote fraud and voter intimidation that is present on a national scale. The consultants’ work is neither comprehensive nor conclusive. This first phase of an envisioned two-phase project was constrained by both time and funding. The consultants’ conclusions and recommendations for phase II will be contained in this report.

The consultants, working without the aid of a support staff, divided most of the work. However, the final work product was mutually checked and approved. They agreed upon the steps that were taken needed and the method employed. For all of the documentary sources, the consultants limited the time period under review from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2006. The research performed by the consultants included interviews, an extensive Nexis search, a review of existing literature, and case research.

Interviews: The consultants chose the interviewees by first coming up with a list of the categories of types of people they wanted to interview. Then the consultants separately, equally filled those categories with a certain number of people. Due to time and resource constraints, the consultants had to pare down this list substantially – for instance, they had to rule out interviewing prosecutors altogether – but still got a good range of people to talk to. The ultimate categories were academics, advocates, elections officials, lawyers and judges. Although the consultants were able to talk to most of the people they wanted to, some were unavailable and a few were not comfortable speaking to them, particularly judges. The consultants together conducted all of the interviews, either by phone or in person. Then the consultants split up drafting the summaries. All summaries were reviewed and mutually approved. Most of the interviews were extremely informative and the consultants found the interviewees to be extremely knowledgeable and insightful for the most part.

Nexis: Initially, the consultants developed an enormous list of possible Nexis search terms. It soon became obvious that it would be impossible to conduct the research that way. As a result, consultant Wang performed the Nexis search by finding search term combinations that would yield virtually every article on a particular subject from the last

five years. Consultant Serebrov approved the search terms. Then Wang created an excel spreadsheet in order to break down the articles in way in which they could be effectively analyzed for patterns. Each type of fraud is broken down in a separate chart according to where it took place, the date, the type of election it occurred in, what the allegation was, the publication it came from. Where there was a follow up article, any information that that suggested there had been some further action taken or some resolution to the allegation was also included. For four very complicated and long drawn out situations – Washington State, Wisconsin, South Dakota in 2004, and the vote buying cases in a couple of particular jurisdictions over the last several years –written summaries with news citations are provided.

Existing Literature: Part of the selections made by the consultants resulted from consultant Wang's long-term familiarity with the material while part was the result of a joint web search for articles and books on vote fraud and voter intimidation and suggestions from those interviewed by the consultants. The consultants reviewed a wide range of materials from government reports and investigations, to academic literature, to reports published by advocacy groups. The consultants believe that they covered the landscape of available sources.

Cases: In order to properly identify all applicable cases, the consultants first developed an extensive word search term list. A WestLaw search was performed and the first one hundred cases under each word search term were then gathered in individual files. This resulted in a total of approximately 44,000 cases. Most of these cases were federal as opposed to state and appellate as opposed to trial. Consultant Serebrov analyzed the cases in each file to determine if they were on point. If he found that the first twenty cases were inapplicable, Serebrov would sample forty to fifty other file cases at random to determine applicability. If the entire file did not yield any cases, the file would be discarded. All discarded word search terms were recorded in a separate file. Likewise, if the file only yielded a few applicable cases, it would also be discarded. However, if a small but significant number of cases were on point, the file was later charted. The results of the case search were stark because relatively few applicable cases were found.

Working Definition of Fraud and Intimidation

Note: The definition provided below is for the purposes of this EAC project. Most of the acts described come within the federal criminal definition of fraud, but some may not.

what does this mean?
Election fraud is any intentional action, or intentional failure to act when there is a duty to do so, that corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on election outcomes. This includes interfering in the process by which persons register to vote; the way in which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; and the process by which election results are canvassed and certified.

Examples include the following:

- falsifying voter registration information pertinent to eligibility to cast a vote, (e.g. residence, criminal status, etc.);
- altering completed voter registration applications by entering false information;
- knowingly destroying completed voter registration applications (other than spoiled applications) before they can be submitted to the proper election authority;
- knowingly removing eligible voters from voter registration lists, in violation of HAVA, NVRA, or state election laws;
- intentional destruction by election officials of voter registration records or balloting records, in violation of records retention laws, to remove evidence of election fraud;
- vote buying;
- voting in the name of another;
- voting more than once;
- coercing a voter's choice on an absentee ballot;
- using a false name and/or signature on an absentee ballot;
- destroying or misappropriating an absentee ballot;
- felons, or in some states ex-felons, who vote when they know they are ineligible to do so;
- misleading an ex-felon about his or her right to vote; *knowledge is not an*
- voting by non-citizens who know they are ineligible to do so; *element*
- intimidating practices aimed at vote suppression or deterrence, including the abuse of challenge laws;
- deceiving voters with false information (e.g.; deliberately directing voters to the wrong polling place or providing false information on polling hours and dates);
- knowingly failing to accept voter registration applications, to provide ballots, or to accept and count voted ballots in accordance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act;
- intentional miscounting of ballots by election officials;
- intentional misrepresentation of vote tallies by election officials;
- acting in any other manner with the intention of suppressing voter registration or voting, or interfering with vote counting and the certification of the vote.

who?

who?

*don't know
- that's not a crime*

*misfeasance
malfeasance*

Voting fraud does not include mistakes made in the course of voter registration, balloting, or tabulating ballots and certifying results. For purposes of the EAC study, it also does not include violations of campaign finance laws.

DRAFT

Summaries of Research Conducted

Interviews

Common Themes

- There is virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem, with vote buying and registration fraud coming in after that. The vote buying often comes in the form of payment for absentee ballots, although not always. Some absentee ballot fraud is part of an organized effort; some is by individuals, who sometimes are not even aware that what they are doing is illegal. Voter registration fraud seems to take the form of people signing up with false names. Registration fraud seems to be most common where people doing the registration were paid by the signature.
- There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, “dead” voters, noncitizen voting and felon voters. Those few who believe it occurs often enough to be a concern say that it is impossible to show the extent to which it happens, but do point to instances in the press of such incidents. Most people believe that false registration forms have not resulted in polling place fraud, although it may create the perception that vote fraud is possible. Those who believe there is more polling place fraud than reported/investigated/prosecuted believe that registration fraud does lead to fraudulent votes. Jason Torchinsky from the American Center for Voting Rights is the only interviewee who believes that polling place fraud is widespread and among the most significant problems in the system.
- Abuse of challenger laws and abusive challengers seem to be the biggest intimidation/suppression concerns, and many of those interviewed assert that the new identification requirements are the modern version of voter intimidation and suppression. However there is evidence of some continued outright intimidation and suppression, especially in some Native American communities. A number of people also raise the problem of poll workers engaging in harassment of minority voters. Other activities commonly raised were the issue of polling places being moved at the last moment, unequal distribution of voting machines, videotaping of voters at the polls, and targeted misinformation campaigns.
- Several people indicate – including representatives from DOJ -- that for various reasons, the Department of Justice is bringing fewer voter intimidation and suppression cases now and is focusing on matters such as noncitizen voting, double voting and felon voting. While the civil rights section continues to focus on systemic patterns of malfeasance, the public integrity section is focusing now on individuals, on isolated instances of fraud.
- The problem of badly kept voter registration lists, with both ineligible voters remaining on the rolls and eligible voters being taken off, remains a common concern. A few people are also troubled by voters being on registration lists in two states. They said that there was no evidence that this had led to double voting, but it opens the door to the possibility. There is great hope that full

What does this mean?

Not Fraud

DOJ disparity

implementation of the new requirements of HAVA – done well, a major caveat – will reduce this problem dramatically.

Common Recommendations:

- Many of those interviewed recommend better poll worker training as the best way to improve the process; a few also recommended longer voting times or voting on days other than election day (such as weekends) but fewer polling places so only the best poll workers would be employed
- Many interviewed support stronger criminal laws and increased enforcement of existing laws with respect to both fraud and intimidation. Advocates from across the spectrum expressed frustration with the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue complaints.
 - With respect to the civil rights section, John Tanner indicated that fewer cases are being brought because fewer are warranted – it has become increasingly difficult to know when allegations of intimidation and suppression are credible since it depends on one’s definition of intimidation, and because both parties are doing it. Moreover prior enforcement of the laws has now changed the entire landscape – race based problems are rare now. Although challenges based on race and unequal implementation of identification rules would be actionable, Mr. Tanner was unaware of such situations actually occurring and the section has not pursued any such cases.
 - Craig Donsanto of the public integrity section says that while the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate claims of fraud, the number of cases the department is investigating and the number of indictments the section is pursuing are both up dramatically. Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters and double voters than ever before. Mr. Donsanto would like more resources so it can do more and would like to have laws that make it easier for the federal government to assume jurisdiction over voter fraud cases.
- A couple of interviewees recommend a new law that would make it easier to criminally prosecute people for intimidation even when there is not racial animus.
- Almost everyone hopes that administrators will maximize the potential of statewide voter registration databases to prevent fraud. Of particular note, Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of Elections for Kentucky, emphasized that having had an effective statewide voter registration database for more than thirty years has helped that state avoid most of the fraud problems that have been alleged elsewhere, such as double voting and felon voting.
- Several advocate expanded monitoring of the polls, including some associated with the Department of Justice.
- Challenge laws, both with respect to pre-election day challenges and challengers at the polls, need to be revised by all states to ensure they are not used for purposes of wrongful disenfranchisement and harassment

These are criminal matters

- Several people advocate passage of Senator Barak Obama's "deceptive practices" bill
- There is a split on whether it would be helpful to have nonpartisan election officials – some indicated they thought even if elections officials are elected nonpartisanly they will carry out their duties in biased ways nonetheless. However, most agree that elections officials pursuing partisan agendas is a problem that must be addressed in some fashion. Suggestions included moving election responsibilities out of the secretary of states' office; increasing transparency in the process; and enacting conflict of interest rules.
- A few recommend returning to allowing use of absentee ballots "for cause" only if it were politically feasible.
- A few recommend enacting a national identification card, including Pat Rogers, an attorney in New Mexico, and Jason Torchinsky from ACVR, who advocates the scheme contemplated in the Carter-Baker Commission Report.
- A couple of interviewees indicated the need for clear standards for the distribution of voting machines

Nexis Research

Absentee Ballot Fraud

According to press reports, absentee ballots are abused in a variety of ways:

- Campaign workers, candidates and others coerce the voting choices of vulnerable populations, usually elderly voters
- Workers for groups and individuals have attempted to vote absentee in the names of the deceased
- Workers for groups, campaign workers and individuals have attempted to forge the names of other voters on absentee ballot requests and absentee ballots and thus vote multiple times

It is unclear how often actual convictions result from these activities (a handful of articles indicate convictions and guilty pleas), but this is an area in which there have been a substantial number of official investigations and actual charges filed, according to news reports where such information is available. A few of the allegations became part of civil court proceedings contesting the outcome of the election.

While absentee fraud allegations turn up throughout the country, a few states have had several such cases. Especially of note are Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and most particularly, Texas. Interestingly, there were no articles regarding Oregon, where the entire system is vote by mail.

Voter Registration Fraud

According to press reports, the following types of allegations of voter registration fraud are most common:

- Registering in the name of dead people
- Fake names and other information on voter registration forms
- Illegitimate addresses used on voter registration forms
- Voters being tricked into registering for a particular party under false pretenses
- Destruction of voter registration forms depending on the party the voter registered with

There was only one self evident instance of a noncitizen registering to vote. Many of the instances reported on included official investigations and charges filed, but few actual convictions, at least from the news reporting. There have been multiple reports of registration fraud in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.

Voter Intimidation and Suppression

This is the area which had the most articles in part because there were so many allegations of intimidation and suppression during the 2004 election. Most of these remained allegations and no criminal investigation or prosecution ensued. Some of the cases did end up in civil litigation.

This is not to say that these alleged activities were confined to 2004 – there were several allegations made during every year studied. Most notable were the high number of allegations of voter intimidation and harassment reported during the 2003 Philadelphia mayoral race.

A very high number of the articles were about the issue of challenges to voters' registration status and challengers at the polling places. There were many allegations that planned challenge activities were targeted at minority communities. Some of the challenges were concentrated in immigrant communities.

However, the tactics alleged varied greatly. The types of activities discussed also include the following:

- Photographing or videotaping voters coming out of polling places.
- Improper demands for identification
- Poll watchers harassing voters
- Poll workers being hostile to or aggressively challenging voters
- Disproportionate police presence
- Poll watchers wearing clothes with messages that seemed intended to intimidate
- Insufficient voting machines and unmanageably long lines

Although the incidents reported on occurred everywhere, not surprisingly, many came from “battleground” states. There were several such reports out of Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

“Dead Voters and Multiple Voting”

There were a high number of articles about people voting in the names of the dead and voting more than once. Many of these articles were marked by allegations of big numbers of people committing these frauds, and relatively few of these allegations turning out to be accurate according to investigations by the newspapers themselves, elections officials and criminal investigators. Often the problem turned out to be a result of administrative error, poll workers mis-marking of voter lists, a flawed registration list and/or errors made in the attempt to match names of voters on the list with the names of the people who voted. In a good number of cases, there were allegations that charges of double voting by political leaders were an effort to scare people away from the voting process.

Nonetheless there were a few cases of people actually being charged and/or convicted for these kinds of activities. Most of the cases involved a person voting both by absentee ballot and in person. A few instances involved people voting both during early voting and on Election Day, which calls into question the proper marking and maintenance of the voting lists. In many instances, the person charged claimed not to have voted twice on purpose. A very small handful of cases involved a voter voting in more than one county and there was one substantiated case involving a person voting in more than one state. Other instances in which such efforts were alleged were disproved by officials.

In the case of voting in the name of a dead person, the problem lay in the voter registration list not being properly maintained, i.e. the person was still on the registration list as eligible to vote, and a person taking criminal advantage of that. In total, the San Francisco Chronicle found 5 such cases in March 2004; the AP cited a newspaper analysis of five such persons in an Indiana primary in May 2004; and a senate committee found two people to have voted in the names of the dead in 2005.

As usual, there were a disproportionate number of such articles coming out of Florida. Notably, there were three articles out of Oregon, which has one hundred percent vote-by-mail.

Vote Buying

There were a surprising number of articles about vote buying cases. A few of these instances involved long-time investigations in three particular jurisdictions as detailed in the vote buying summary. There were more official investigations, indictments and convictions/pleas in this area. All of these cases are concentrated in the Midwest and South.

Deceptive Practices

In 2004 there were numerous reports of intentional disinformation about voting eligibility and the voting process meant to confuse voters about their rights and when and where to vote. Misinformation came in the form of flyers, phone calls, letters, and even people going door to door. Many of the efforts were reportedly targeted at minority communities. A disproportionate number of them came from key battleground states, particularly Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. From the news reports found, only one of these instances was officially investigated, the case in Oregon involving the destruction of voter registration forms. There were no reports of prosecutions or any other legal proceeding.

Non-citizen Voting

There were surprisingly few articles regarding noncitizen registration and voting – just seven all together, in seven different states across the country. They were also evenly split between allegations of noncitizens registering and noncitizens voting. In one case charges were filed against ten individuals. In one case a judge in a civil suit found there was illegal noncitizen voting. Three instances prompted official investigations. Two cases, from this nexis search, remained just allegations of noncitizen voting.

Felon Voting

Although there were only thirteen cases of felon voting, some of them involved large numbers of voters. Most notably, of course, are the cases that came to light in the Washington gubernatorial election contest (see Washington summary) and in Wisconsin (see Wisconsin summary). In several states, the main problem has been the large number of ineligible felons that remained on the voting list.

Election Official Fraud

In most of the cases in which fraud by elections officials is suspected or alleged, it is difficult to determine whether it is incompetence or a crime. There are several cases of ballots gone missing, ballots unaccounted for and ballots ending up in a worker's possession. In two cases workers were said to have changed peoples' votes. The one instance in which widespread ballot box stuffing by elections workers was alleged was in Washington State. The judge in the civil trial of that election contest did not find that elections workers had committed fraud. Four of the cases are from Texas.

Existing Research

There are many reports and books that describe anecdotes and draw broad conclusions from a large array of incidents. There is little research that is truly systematic or scientific. The most systematic look at fraud is the report written by Lori Minnite. The most systematic look at voter intimidation is the report by Laughlin McDonald. Books

written about this subject seem to all have a political bias and a pre-existing agenda that makes them somewhat less valuable.

Researchers agree that measuring something like the incidence of fraud and intimidation in a scientifically legitimate way is extremely difficult from a methodological perspective and would require resources beyond the means of most social and political scientists. As a result, there is much more written on this topic by advocacy groups than social scientists. It is hoped that this gap will be filled in the “second phase” of this EAC project.

Moreover, reports and books make allegations but, perhaps by their nature, have little follow up. As a result, it is difficult to know when something has remained in the stage of being an allegation and gone no further, or progressed to the point of being investigated or prosecuted or in any other way proven to be valid by an independent, neutral entity. This is true, for example, with respect to allegations of voter intimidation by civil rights organizations, and, with respect to fraud, John Fund’s frequently cited book. Again, this is something that it is hoped will be addressed in the “second phase” of this EAC project by doing follow up research on allegations made in reports, books and newspaper articles.

Other items of note:

- There is as much evidence, and as much concern, about structural forms of disenfranchisement as about intentional abuse of the system. These include felon disenfranchisement, poor maintenance of databases and identification requirements.
- There is tremendous disagreement about the extent to which polling place fraud, e.g. double voting, intentional felon voting, noncitizen voting, is a serious problem. On balance, more researchers find it to be less of a problem than is commonly described in the political debate, but some reports say it is a major problem, albeit hard to identify.
- There is substantial concern across the board about absentee balloting and the opportunity it presents for fraud.
- Federal law governing election fraud and intimidation is varied and complex and yet may nonetheless be insufficient or subject to too many limitations to be as effective as it might be.
- Deceptive practices, e.g. targeted flyers and phone calls providing misinformation, were a major problem in 2004.
- Voter intimidation continues to be focused on minority communities, although the American Center for Voting Rights uniquely alleges it is focused on Republicans.

Cases

After reviewing over 40,000 cases, the majority of which came from appeals courts, I have found comparatively very few which are applicable to this study. Of those that are applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerges. However, it seems that the greatest areas of fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility. But because so few cases provided a picture of these current problems, I suggest that case research for the second phase of this project concentrate on state trial-level decisions.

Methodology

The following is a summary of interviews conducted with a number of political scientists and experts in the field as to how one might undertake a comprehensive examination of voter fraud and intimidation. A list of the individuals interviewed and their ideas are available, and all of the individuals welcome any further questions or explanations of their recommended procedures.

- In analyzing instances of alleged fraud and intimidation, we should look to criminology as a model. In criminology, experts use two sources: the Uniform Crime Reports, which are all reports made to the police, and the Victimization Survey, which asks the general public whether a particular incident has happened to them. After surveying what the most common allegations are, we should conduct a survey of the general public that ask whether they have committed certain acts or been subjected to any incidents of fraud or intimidation. This would require using a very large sample, and we would need to employ the services of an expert in survey data collection. (Stephen Ansolobhere, MIT)
- Several political scientists with expertise in these types of studies recommended a methodology that includes interviews, focus groups, and a limited survey. In determining who to interview and where the focus groups should be drawn from, they recommend the following procedure:
 - Pick a number of places that have historically had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 that are geographically and demographically diverse, and have had a diversity of problems
 - Pick a number of places that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation; from that pool pick 10 places that match the geographic and demographic make-up of the previous ten above (and, if possible, have comparable elections practices)

- Assess the resulting overall reports and impressions resulting from these interviews and focus groups, and examine comparisons and differences among the states and what may give rise to them.

In conducting a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, district election officers, they recommend that:

- The survey sample be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets
- The survey must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations

(Allan Lichtman, American University; Thad Hall, University of Utah; Bernard Grofman, UC – Irvine)

- Another political scientist recommended employing a methodology that relies on qualitative data drawn from in-depth interviews with key critics and experts on all sides of the debate on fraud; quantitative data collected through a survey of state and local elections and law enforcement officials; and case studies. Case studies should focus on the five or ten states, regions or cities where there has been a history of election fraud to examine past and present problems. The survey should be mailed to each state's attorney general and secretary of state, each county district attorney's office and each county board of elections in the 50 states. (Lorraine Minnite, Barnard College)
- The research should be a two-step process. Using LexisNexis and other research tools, a search should be conducted of news media accounts over the past decade. Second, interviews with a systematic sample of election officials nationwide and in selected states should be conducted. (Chandler Davidson, Rice University)
- One expert in the field posits that we can never come up with a number that accurately represents either the incidence of fraud or the incidence of voter intimidation. Therefore, the better approach is to do an assessment of what is most likely to happen, what election violations are most likely to be committed – in other words, a risk analysis. This would include an analysis of what it would actually take to commit various acts, e.g. the cost/benefit of each kind of violation. From there we could rank the likely prevalence of each type of activity and examine what measures are or could be effective in combating them. (Wendy Weiser, Brennan Center of New York University)
- Replicate a study in the United States done abroad by Susan Hyde of the University of California- San Diego examining the impact of impartial poll site observers on the incidence of election fraud. Doing this retrospectively would require the following steps:
 - Find out where there were federal observers
 - Get precinct level voting information for those places

- Analyze whether there was any difference in election outcomes in those places with and without observers, and whether any of these results seem anomalous.

Despite the tremendous differences in the political landscapes of the countries examined by Hyde in previous studies and the U.S., Hyde believes this study could be effectively replicated in this country by sending observers to a random sample of precincts. Rather than compare the incumbent's vote share, such factors such as voter complaints, voter turnout, number of provisional ballots used, composition of the electorate, as well as any anomalous voting results could be compared between sites with and without monitors.

For example, if intimidation is occurring, and if reputable monitors make intimidation less likely or voters more confident, then turnout should be higher on average in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If polling station officials are intentionally refusing to issue provisional ballots, and the polling station officials are more likely to adhere to regulations while being monitored, the average number of provisional ballots should be higher in monitored precincts than in unmonitored precincts. If monitors cause polling station officials to adhere more closely to regulations, then there should be fewer complaints (in general) about monitored than unmonitored precincts (this could also be reversed if monitors made voters more likely to complain).

Again, random assignment controls for all of the other factors that otherwise influence these variables.

One of the downsides of this approach is it does not get at some forms of fraud, e.g. absentee ballot fraud; those would have to be analyzed separately.

- Another political scientist recommends conducting an analysis of vote fraud claims and purging of registration rolls by list matching. Allegations of illegal voting often are based on matching of names and birth dates. Alleged instances of double voting are based on matching the names and birth dates of persons found on voting records. Allegations of ineligible felon (depending on state law), deceased, and of non-citizen voting are based on matching lists of names, birth dates, and sometimes addresses of such people against a voting records. Anyone with basic relational database skills can perform such matching in a matter of minutes.

However, there are a number of pitfalls for the unwary that can lead to grossly over-estimating the number of fraudulent votes, such as missing or ignored middle names and suffixes or matching on missing birth dates. Furthermore, there is a surprising statistical fact that a group of about three hundred people with the same first and last name are almost assured to share the exact same birth date, including year. In a large state, it is not uncommon for hundreds of Robert Smiths (and other common names) to have voted. Thus, allegations of vote fraud

or purging of voter registration rolls by list matching almost assuredly will find a large proportion of false positives: people who voted legally or are registered to vote legally.

Statistics can be rigorously applied to determine how many names would be expected to be matched by chance. A simulation approach is best applied here: randomly assign a birth date to an arbitrary number of people and observe how many match within the list or across lists. The simulation is repeated many times to average out the variation due to chance. The results can then be matched back to actual voting records and purge lists, for example, in the hotly contested states of Ohio or Florida, or in states with Election Day registration where there are concerns that easy access to voting permits double voting. This analysis will rigorously identify the magnitude alleged voter fraud, and may very well find instances of alleged fraud that exceed what might have otherwise happened by chance.

This same political scientist also recommends another way to examine the problem: look at statistics on provisional voting: the number cast might provide indications of intimidation (people being challenged at the polls) and the number of those not counted would be indications of "vote fraud." One could look at those jurisdictions in the Election Day Survey with a disproportionate number of provisional ballots cast and cross reference it with demographics and number of provisional ballots discarded. (Michael McDonald, George Mason University)

- Spencer Overton, in a forthcoming law review article entitled *Voter Identification*, suggests a methodology that employs three approaches—investigations of voter fraud, random surveys of voters who purported to vote, and an examination of death rolls provide a better understanding of the frequency of fraud. He says all three approaches have strengths and weaknesses, and thus the best studies would employ all three to assess the extent of voter fraud. An excerpt follows:

1. Investigations and Prosecutions of Voter Fraud

Policymakers should develop databases that record all investigations, allegations, charges, trials, convictions, acquittals, and plea bargains regarding voter fraud. Existing studies are incomplete but provide some insight. For example, a statewide survey of each of Ohio's 88 county boards of elections found only four instances of ineligible persons attempting to vote out of a total of 9,078,728 votes cast in the state's 2002 and 2004 general elections. This is a fraud rate of 0.00000045 percent. The Carter-Baker Commission's Report noted that since October 2002, federal officials had charged 89 individuals with casting multiple votes, providing false information about their felon status, buying votes, submitting false voter registration information, and voting improperly as a non-citizen. Examined in the context of the 196,139,871 ballots cast between October 2002 and

August 2005, this represents a fraud rate of 0.0000005 percent (note also that not all of the activities charged would have been prevented by a photo identification requirement).

A more comprehensive study should distinguish voter fraud that could be prevented by a photo identification requirement from other types of fraud — such as absentee voting and stuffing ballot boxes — and obtain statistics on the factors that led law enforcement to prosecute fraud. The study would demand significant resources because it would require that researchers interview and pour over the records of local district attorneys and election boards.

Hard data on investigations, allegations, charges, pleas, and prosecutions is important because it quantifies the amount of fraud officials detect. Even if prosecutors vigorously pursue voter fraud, however, the number of fraud cases charged probably does not capture the total amount of voter fraud. Information on official investigations, charges, and prosecutions should be supplemented by surveys of voters and a comparison of voting rolls to death rolls.

2. *Random Surveys of Voters*

Random surveys could give insight about the percentage of votes cast fraudulently. For example, political scientists could contact a statistically representative sampling of 1,000 people who purportedly voted at the polls in the last election, ask them if they actually voted, and confirm the percentage who are valid voters. Researchers should conduct the survey soon after an election to locate as many legitimate voters as possible with fresh memories.

Because many respondents would perceive voting as a social good, some who did not vote might claim that they did, which may underestimate the extent of fraud. A surveyor might mitigate this skew through the framing of the question (“I’ve got a record that you voted. Is that true?”).

Further, some voters will not be located by researchers and others will refuse to talk to researchers. Photo identification proponents might construe these non-respondents as improper registrations that were used to commit voter fraud.

Instead of surveying all voters to determine the amount of fraud, researchers might reduce the margin of error by focusing on a random sampling of voters who signed affidavits in the three states that request photo identification but also allow voters to establish their identity through affidavit—Florida, Louisiana, and South Dakota. In

South Dakota, for example, only two percent of voters signed affidavits to establish their identity. If the survey indicates that 95 percent of those who signed affidavits are legitimate voters (and the other 5 percent were shown to be either fraudulent or were non-responsive), this suggests that voter fraud accounts for, at the maximum, 0.1 percent of ballots cast.

The affidavit study, however, is limited to three states, and it is unclear whether this sample is representative of other states (the difficulty may be magnified in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of hundreds of thousands of voters). Further, the affidavit study reveals information about the amount of fraud in a photo identification state with an affidavit exception—more voter fraud may exist in a state that does not request photo identification.

3. *Examining Death Rolls*

A comparison of death rolls to voting rolls might also provide an estimate of fraud.

Imagine that one million people live in state A, which has no documentary identification requirement. Death records show that 20,000 people passed away in state A in 2003. A cross-referencing of this list to the voter rolls shows that 10,000 of those who died were registered voters, and these names remained on the voter rolls during the November 2004 election. Researchers would look at what percentage of the 10,000 dead-but-registered people who "voted" in the November 2004 election. A researcher should distinguish the votes cast in the name of the dead at the polls from those cast absentee (which a photo identification requirement would not prevent). This number would be extrapolated to the electorate as a whole.

This methodology also has its strengths and weaknesses. If fraudulent voters target the dead, the study might overestimate the fraud that exists among living voters (although a low incidence of fraud among deceased voters might suggest that fraud among all voters is low). The appearance of fraud also might be inflated by false positives produced by a computer match of different people with the same name. Photo identification advocates would likely assert that the rate of voter fraud could be higher among fictitious names registered, and that the death record survey would not capture that type of fraud because fictitious names registered would not show up in the death records. Nevertheless, this study, combined with the other two, would provide important insight into the magnitude of fraud likely to exist in the absence of a photo identification requirement.

**Recommendations for Further EAC Activity
on Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation**

Consultants' Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews X

Time and resource constraints prevented the consultants from interviewing the full range of participants in the process. As a result, we recommend that any future activity in this area include conducting further interviews.

In particular, we recommend that more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and parties be interviewed. These individuals have the most direct inside information on how the system works -- and at times does not work. They are often the first people voters go to when something goes wrong and are often responsible for fixing it. They are the ones who must carry out the measures that are designed to both prevent fraud and voter intimidation and suppression. They will most likely know what, therefore, is and is not working.

It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

The Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys appoint Assistant U.S. Attorneys to serve as DEOs for two years. DEOs are required to

- screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation;
- oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts;
- coordinate their district's (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors;
- coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters;
- issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and
- supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day.¹

Given the great responsibilities of the DEOs, and the breadth of issues they must deal with, they undoubtedly are great resources for information and insight as to what types of fraud and intimidation/suppression are occurring in their districts.

In many situations, however, it is the local district attorneys who will investigate election fraud and suppression tactics, especially in local elections. They will be able to provide information on what has gone on in their jurisdictions, as well as which matters get pursued and why.

Finally, those who defend people accused of election related crimes would also be useful to speak to. They may have a different perspective on how well the system is working to detect, prevent, and prosecute election fraud.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Nexis Research X

The Nexis search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by both consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. However, without being able to go beyond the agreed search terms, it could not be determined whether there was any later determination regarding the allegations, investigation or charges brought. This leaves a gaping hole: it is impossible to know if the article is just reporting on “talk” or what turns out to be a serious affront to the system.

As a result, we recommend that follow up Nexis research be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case. This would provide a much more accurate picture of what types of activities are actually taking place.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review X

Similarly, many allegations are made in the reports and books that we analyzed and summarized. Those allegations are often not substantiated in any way and are inherently time limited by the date of the writing. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation.

Therefore, we recommend follow up to the literature review: for those reports and books that make or cite specific instances of fraud or intimidation, a research effort should be made to follow up on those references to see if and how they were resolved.

Recommendation 4: Review Complaints File With MyVote1 Project Voter Hotline X

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint.

In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints.ⁱⁱ The researchers in charge of this project have done a great deal of work to parse and analyze the data collected through this process, including going through the audio messages and categorizing them by the nature of the complaint. These categories include registration, absentee ballot, poll access, ballot/screen, coercion/intimidation, identification, mechanical, provisional (ballot).

We recommend that further research include making full use of this data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints should provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

✓ CRIMINAL DIVISION

Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety in ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation,ⁱⁱⁱ the Section was extremely reluctant to provide the consultants with useful information. Further attempts should be made to obtain relevant data. This includes the telephone logs of complaints the Section keeps and information from the database – the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system – the Section maintains on complaints received and the corresponding action taken. We also recommend that further research include a review and analysis of the observer and monitor field reports from Election Day that must be filed with the Section.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

✓

Similarly, the consultants believe it would be useful for any further research to include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As noted above, the DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

✗

The consultants also believe it would be useful for any further activity in this area to include attendance at the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. According to the Department,^{iv}

Prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices are required to attend annual training conferences on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses... These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity

Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. As a result of these conferences, there is a nationwide increase in Department expertise relating to the prosecution of election crimes and the enforcement of voting rights.

By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following:

- How District Election Officers are trained, e.g. what they are taught to focus their resources on, how they are instructed to respond to various types of complaints
- How information about previous election and voting issues is presented
- How the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants

Recommendation 8: Employ Academic or Individual to Conduct Statistical Research ✓

Included in this report is a summary of various methodologies political scientists and others suggested to measure voter fraud and intimidation. While we note the skepticism of the Working Group in this regard, we nonetheless recommend that in order to further the mission of providing unbiased data, further activity in this area include an academic institution and/or individual that focuses on sound, statistical methods for political science research.

Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Finally, consultant Tova Wang recommends that future researchers review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

According to Craig Donsanto, long-time Director of the Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice:

As with other statutes addressing voter intimidation, in the absence of any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is the Criminal Division's position that section 1973gg-10(1) applies only to intimidation which is accomplished through the use of threats of physical or economic duress. Voter "intimidation" accomplished through less drastic means may present violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b), which are enforced by the Civil Rights Division through noncriminal remedies.^v

Mr. Donsanto reiterated these points to us on several occasions, including at the working group meeting.

7, MAYBE, BUT
TOO SOON
TO TELL

As a result, researchers should examine if there is some way in which current law might be revised or new laws passed that would reach voter intimidation that does not threaten the voter physically or financially, but rather threatens the voter's right to vote as a tangible value in itself. Such an amendment or law would reach all forms of voter intimidation, no matter if it is motivated by race, party, ethnicity or any other criteria. The law would then *potentially* cover, for example, letters and postcards with language meant to deter voters from voting and both pre-election and Election Day challengers that are clearly mounting challenges solely on illegitimate bases.

In the alternative to finding a way to criminalize such behavior, researchers might examine ways to invigorate measures to deter and punish voter intimidation under the civil law. For example, there might be a private right of action created for voters or groups who have been subjected to intimidation tactics in the voting process. Such an action could be brought against individual offenders; any state or local actor where there is a pattern of repeated abuse in the jurisdiction that such officials did not take sufficient action against; and organizations that intentionally engage in intimidating practices. As a penalty upon finding liability, civil damages could be available plus perhaps attorney's fees.

Another, more modest measure would be, as has been suggested by Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley,^{vi} to bring parity to fines for violations under the Voting Rights Act. Currently the penalty for fraud is \$10,000 while the penalty for acts to deprive the right to vote is \$5,000.

Working Group Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Employ Observers To Collect Data in the 2006 and/or 2008 Elections X

At the working group meeting, there was much discussion about using observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls in the upcoming elections. Mr. Ginsberg recommended using representatives of both parties for the task. Mr. Bauer and others objected to this, believing that using partisans as observers would be unworkable and would not be credible to the public.

There was even greater concern about the difficulties in getting access to poll sites for the purposes of observation. Most states strictly limit who can be in the polling place. In addition, there are already so many groups doing observation and monitoring at the polls, administrators might object. There was further concern that observers would introduce a variable into the process that would impact the outcome. The very fact that observers were present would influence behavior and skew the results.

Moreover, it was pointed out, many of the problems we see now with respect to fraud and intimidation does not take place at the polling place, e.g. absentee ballot fraud and deceptive practices. Poll site monitoring would not capture this activity. Moreover, with

increased use of early voting, poll site monitoring might have to go on for weeks to be effective, which would require tremendous resources.

Mr. Weinberg suggested using observers in the way they are utilized in international elections. Such observers come into a jurisdiction prior to the election, and use standardized forms at the polling sites to collect data.

Recommendation 2: Do a Study on Absentee Ballot Fraud

X ALL OR NOTHING

The working group agreed that since absentee ballot fraud is the main form of fraud occurring, and is a practice that is great expanding throughout the country, it would make sense to do a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud. Such a study would be facilitated by the fact that there already is a great deal of information on how, when, where and why such practices are carried out based on cases successfully prosecuted. Researchers could look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

Recommendation 3: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud¹

? PROBABLY NOT WOULD NOT SERVE OUR PURPOSES

Working group members were supportive of one of the methodologies recommended for studying this issue, risk analysis. As Mr. Bauer put it, based on the assumption that people act rationally, do an examination of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit, given the relative costs and benefits. In that way, researchers can rank the types of fraud that are the easiest to commit at the least cost with the greatest effect, from most to least likely to occur. This might prove a more practical way of measuring the problems than trying to actually get a number of acts of fraud and/or intimidation occurring. Mr. Greenbaum added that one would want to examine what conditions surrounding an election would be most likely to lead to an increase in fraud. Mr. Rokita objected based on his belief that the passions of partisanship lead people to not act rationally in an election.

Recommendation 4: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

NOT OUR PLACE

Picking up on a suggestion made by Spencer Overton and explained in the suggested methodology section, Mr. Hearne recommended studying the issue using statistical database matching. Researchers should compare the voter roll and the list of people who actually voted to see if there are “dead” and felon voters. Because of the inconsistent quality of the databases, however, a political scientist would need to work in an appropriate margin of error when using such a methodology.

Recommendation 5: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of

CIVIL - DO WE WANT TO DO THIS?

¹ See Appendix C, and section on methodology

groups, including the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices, which may be available for review and analysis. This is also an area in which there is often tangible evidence, such as copies of the flyers and postcards themselves. All of this information should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 6: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure As Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

POSSIBLE,

The EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 7: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts that are running before, during and after election day would be an effective means of disposing with complaints and violations in an expeditious manner. Pennsylvania employs such a system, and the EAC should consider investigating how well it is working to deal with fraud and intimidation problems.

X NOT OUR PLACE AT THIS TIME
① THING AT A TIME.

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Key Working Group Observations and Concerns

Working Group Observations

1. ***The main problems today are structural barriers to voting and administrative error.*** Mr. Perez observed that, in accordance with the research, the biggest issues today are structural barriers to voting, not stealing votes. Election administrators share this view. Election fraud is negligible, and to the extent it occurs, it needs to be prosecuted with stronger criminal laws. The biggest problem is properly preparing people, which is the responsibility of election administrators.
2. ***Most fraud and intimidation is happening outside of the polling place.*** Mr. Greenbaum observed that with respect to both voter fraud and voter suppression, such as deceptive practices and tearing up voter registration forms, most of that is taking place outside of the polling place.
3. ***This issue cannot be addressed through one study or one methodology alone.*** Mr. Weinberg observed that since there is such a variety in types of fraud and intimidation, one solution will not fit all. It will be impossible to obtain data or resolve any of these problems through a single method.
4. ***The preliminary research conducted for this project is extremely valuable.*** Several of the working group members complimented the quality of the research done and although it is only preliminary, thought it would be useful and informative in the immediate future.
5. ***The Department of Justice is exploring expanding its reach over voter suppression activities.*** In the context of the conversation about defining voter intimidation, Mr. Donsanto pointed out that while voter intimidation was strictly defined by the criminal law, his section is beginning to explore the slightly different concept of vote suppression, and how to pursue it. He mentioned the phone-jamming case in New Hampshire as an initial success in this effort. He noted that he believes that vote suppression in the form of deceptive practices ought to be a crime and the section is exploring ways to go after it within the existing statutory construct. Mr. Bauer raised the example of a party sending people dressed in paramilitary outfits to yell at people as they go to the polls, telling them they have to show identification. Mr. Donsanto said that under the laws he has to work with today, such activity is not considered corrupt. He said that his lawyers are trying to “bend” the current laws to address aggravated cases of vote suppression, and the phone-jamming case is an example of that. Mr. Donsanto said that within the Department, the term vote “suppression” and translating it into a crime is a “work in progress.”

6. **Registration fraud does not translate into vote fraud.** Ms. Rogers, Mr. Donsanto and others stated that although phony voter registration applications turned in by people being paid by the form was a problem, it has not been found in their experience to lead to fraudulent voters at the polls. Ms. Rogers said such people were motivated by money, not defrauding the election.
7. **Handling of voter fraud and intimidation complaints varies widely across states and localities.** Ms. Rogers and others observed that every state has its own process for intake and review of complaints of fraud and intimidation, and that procedures often vary within states. The amount of authority secretaries of state have to address such problems also is different in every state. Mr. Weinberg stated he believed that most secretaries of state did not have authority to do anything about these matters. Participants discussed whether secretaries ought to be given greater authority so as to centralize the process, as HAVA has mandated in other areas.

Working Group Concerns

1. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the purpose of the present project ought to be on assessing the level of fraud and where it is, rather than on developing methods for making such measurements. He believed that methodology should be the focus, “rather than opinions of interviewees.” He was concerned that the EAC would be in a position of “adding to the universe of opinions.”
2. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the “opinions” accumulated in the research “is a fair sampling of what’s out there.” Ms. Wang responded that one of the purposes of the research was to explore whether there is a method available to actually quantify in some way how much fraud there is and where it is occurring in the electoral process. Mr. Rokita replied that “Maybe at the end of the day we stop spending taxpayer money or it’s going to be too much to spend to find that kind of data. Otherwise, we will stop it here and recognize there is a huge difference of opinion on that issue of fraud, when it occurs is obtainable, and that would possibly be a conclusion of the EAC.” Ms. Sims responded that she thought it would be possible to get better statistics on fraud and there might be a way of “identifying at this point certain parts in the election process that are more vulnerable, that we should be addressing.”
3. Mr. Rokita stated that, “We’re not sure that fraud at the polling place doesn’t exist. We can’t conclude that.”
4. Mr. Rokita expressed concern about working with a political scientist. He believes that the “EAC needs to be very careful in who they select, because all the time and effort and money that’s been spent up to date and would be spent in the future could be invalidated by a wrong selection in the eyes of some group.”

NEXIS Charts

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Case Charts

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Appendix 1
List of Individuals Interviewed

Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite, Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley, ACLU Voting Rights Project

Nina Perales, Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Pat Rogers, attorney, New Mexico

Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobhere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson, Rice University

Tracey Campbell, author, *Deliver the Vote*

Douglas Webber, Assistant Attorney General, Indiana, (defendant in the Indiana voter identification litigation)

Heather Dawn Thompson, Director of Government Relations, National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky, Assistant General Counsel, American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette, Executive Director, American Center for Voting Rights

Joseph Rich, former Director of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Joseph Sandler, Counsel to the Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz, Executive Director, New York City Board of Elections

John Tanner, Director, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Wisconsin
Evelyn Stratton, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello, Executive Director, International Association of
Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers

Harry Van Sickle, Commissioner of Elections, Pennsylvania

Craig Donsanto, Director, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice

Sharon Priest, former Secretary of State, Arkansas

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Tracy Campbell, *Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005.

David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson, *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House: Foolhardiness, Folly, and Fraud in the Presidential Elections, from Andrew Jackson to George W. Bush*, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004.

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Appendix 3

Excerpt from “Machinery of Democracy,” a Brennan Center Report

APPENDIX C

BRENNAN CENTER TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, LAWRENCE NORDEN, CHAIR

Excerpted from pp. 8-19

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force concluded, and the peer review team at NIST agreed, that the best approach for comprehensively evaluating voting system threats was to: (1) identify and categorize the potential threats against voting systems, (2) prioritize these threats based upon an agreed upon metric (which would tell us how difficult each threat is to accomplish from the attacker's point of view), and (3) determine, utilizing the same metric employed to prioritize threats, how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks would become after various sets of countermeasures are implemented.

This model allows us to identify the attacks we should be most concerned about (*i.e.*, the most practical and least difficult attacks). Furthermore, it allows us to quantify the potential effectiveness of various sets of countermeasures (*i.e.*, how difficult the least difficult attack is after the countermeasure has been implemented). Other potential models considered, but ultimately rejected by the Task Force, are detailed in Appendix B.

IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS

The first step in creating a threat model for voting systems was to identify as many potential attacks as possible. To that end, the Task Force, together with the participating election officials, spent several months identifying voting system vulnerabilities. Following this work, NIST held a Voting Systems Threat Analysis Workshop on October 7, 2005. Members of the public were invited to write up and post additional potential attacks. Taken together, this work produced over 120 potential attacks on the three voting systems. They are detailed in the catalogs annexed.²⁰ Many of the attacks are described in more detail at <http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers.htm>.

The types of threats detailed in the catalogs can be broken down into nine categories: (1) the insertion of corrupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2) wireless and other remote control attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3) attacks on tally servers; (4) miscalibration of voting machines; (5) shut off of voting machine features intended to assist voters; (6) denial of service attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or others at the polling place to affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; (9) attacks on ballots or VVPT. Often, the actual attacks

involve some combination of these categories. We provide a discussion of each type of attack in “Categories of Attacks,” *infra* at pp. 24–27.

PRIORITIZING THREATS: NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Without some form of prioritization, a compilation of the threats is of limited value. Only by prioritizing these various threats could we help election officials identify which attacks they should be most concerned about, and what steps could be taken to make such attacks as difficult as possible. As discussed below, we have determined the level of difficulty for each attack where the attacker is attempting to affect the outcome of a close statewide election.²¹

There is no perfect way to determine which attacks are the least difficult, because each attack requires a different mix of resources – well-placed insiders, money, programming skills, security expertise, *etc.* Different attackers would find certain resources easier to acquire than others. For example, election fraud committed by local election officials would always involve well-placed insiders and a thorough understanding of election procedures; at the same time, there is no reason to expect such officials to have highly skilled hackers or first-rate programmers working with them. By contrast, election fraud carried out by a foreign government would likely start with plenty of money and technically skilled attackers, but probably without many conveniently placed insiders or detailed knowledge of election procedures.

Ultimately, we decided to use the “number of informed participants” as the metric for determining attack difficulty. An attack which uses fewer participants is deemed the easier attack.

We have defined “informed participant” as someone whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows enough about the attack to foil or expose it. This is to be distinguished from a participant who unknowingly assists the attack by performing a task that is integral to the attack’s successful execution without understanding that the task is part of an attack on voting systems.

The reason for using the security metric “number of informed participants” is relatively straightforward: the larger a conspiracy is, the more difficult it would be to keep it secret. Where an attacker can carry out an attack by herself, she need only trust herself. On the other hand, a conspiracy that requires thousands of people to take part (like a vote-buying scheme) also requires thousands of people to keep quiet. The larger the number of people involved, the greater the likelihood that one of them (or one who was approached, but declined to take part) would either inform the public or authorities about the attack, or commit some kind of error that causes the attack to fail or become known.

Moreover, recruiting a large number of people who are willing to undermine the integrity of a statewide election is also presumably difficult. It is not hard to imagine two or three people agreeing to work to change the outcome of an election. It seems far less likely that an attacker could identify and employ hundreds or thousands of similarly corrupt people without being discovered.

We can get an idea of how this metric works by looking at one of the threats listed in our catalogs: the vote-buying threat, where an attacker or attackers pay individuals to vote for a particular candidate. This is Attack Number 26 in the PCOS Attack Catalog²² (though this attack would not be substantially different against DREs or DREs w/ VVPT).²³ In order to work under our current types of voting systems, this attack requires (1) at least one person to purchase votes, (2) many people to agree to sell their votes, and (3) some way for the purchaser to confirm that the voters she pays actually voted for the candidate she supported. Ultimately, we determined that, while practical in smaller contests, a vote-buying attack would be an exceptionally difficult way to affect the outcome of a statewide election. This is because, even in a typically close statewide election, an attacker would need to involve thousands of voters to ensure that she could affect the outcome of a statewide race.²⁴

For a discussion of other metrics we considered, but ultimately rejected, see Appendix C.

DETERMINING NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS

DETERMINING THE STEPS AND VALUES FOR EACH ATTACK

The Task Force members broke down each of the catalogued attacks into its necessary steps. For instance, Attack 12 in the PCOS Attack Catalog is “Stuffing Ballot Box with Additional Marked Ballots.”²⁵ We determined that, at a minimum, there were three component parts to this attack: (1) stealing or creating the ballots and then marking them, (2) scanning marked ballots through the PCOS scanners, probably before the polls opened, and (3) modifying the poll books in each location to ensure that the total number of votes in the ballot boxes was not greater than the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

Task Force members then assigned a value representing the minimum number of persons they believed would be necessary to accomplish each goal. For PCOS Attack 12, the following values were assigned:²⁶

Minimum number required to steal or create ballots: 5 persons total.²⁷

Minimum number required to scan marked ballots: 1 per polling place attacked.

Minimum number required to modify poll books: 1 per polling place attacked.²⁸

After these values were assigned, the Brennan Center interviewed several election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned to each attack.²⁹ When necessary, the values and steps were modified. The new catalogs, including attack steps and values, were then reviewed by Task Force members. The purpose of this review was to ensure, among other things, that the steps and values were sound.

These steps and values tell us how difficult it would be to accomplish a *single attack in a single polling place*. They do not tell us how many people it would take to change the outcome of an election successfully – that depends, of course, on specific facts about the jurisdiction: how many votes are generally recorded in each polling

place, how many polling places are there in the jurisdiction, and how close is the race? For this reason, we determined that it was necessary to construct a hypothetical jurisdiction, to which we now turn.

NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO CHANGE STATEWIDE ELECTION

We have decided to examine the difficulty of each attack in the context of changing the outcome of a reasonably close statewide election. While we are concerned by potential attacks on voting systems in any type of election, we are most troubled by attacks that have the potential to affect large numbers of votes. These are the attacks that could actually change the outcome of a statewide election with just a handful of attack participants.

We are less troubled by attacks on voting systems that can only affect a small number of votes (and might therefore be more useful in local elections). This is because there are many non-system attacks that can also affect a small number of votes (*i.e.*, sending out misleading information about polling places, physically intimidating voters, submitting multiple absentee ballots, *etc.*). Given the fact that these non-system attacks are likely to be less difficult in terms of number of participants, financial cost, risk of detection, and time commitment, we are uncertain that an attacker would target *voting machines* to alter a small number of votes.

In order to evaluate how difficult it would be for an attacker to change the outcome of a statewide election, we created a composite jurisdiction. The composite jurisdiction was created to be representative of a relatively close statewide election. We did not want to examine a statewide election where results were so skewed toward one candidate (for instance, the re-election of Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 2000, where he won 73% of the vote³⁰), that reversing the election results would be impossible without causing extreme public suspicion. Nor did we want to look at races where changing only a relative handful of votes (for instance, the Governor's race in Washington State in 2004, which was decided by a mere 129 votes³¹) could affect the outcome of an election; under this scenario, many of the potential attacks would involve few people, and therefore look equally difficult.

We have named our composite jurisdiction “the State of Pennasota.” The State of Pennasota is a composite of ten states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin and Minnesota. These states were chosen because they were the ten “battleground” states that Zogby International consistently polled in the spring, summer, and fall 2004.³² These are statewide elections that an attacker would have expected, ahead of time, to be fairly close.

We have also created a composite election, which we label the “Governor’s Race” in Pennasota. The results of this election are a composite of the actual results in the same ten states in the 2004 Presidential Election.

We have used these composites as the framework by which to evaluate the difficulty of the various catalogued attacks.³³ For instance, we know a ballot-box stuffing attack would require roughly five people to create and mark fake ballots, as

well as one person per polling place to stuff the boxes, and one person per polling place to modify the poll books. But, in order to determine how many informed participants would be needed to affect a statewide race, we need to know how many polling places would need to be attacked.

The composite jurisdiction and composite election provide us with information needed to answer these questions: *i.e.*, how many extra votes our attackers would need to add to their favored candidate's total for him to win, how many ballots our attackers can stuff into a particular polling place's ballot box without arousing suspicion (and related to this, how many votes are generally cast in the average polling place), how many polling places are there in the state, *etc.* We provide details about both the composite jurisdiction and election in the section entitled "Governor's Race, State of Pennasota, 2007," *infra* at pp 20–27.

LIMITS OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Of the possible metrics we considered, we believe that measuring the number of people who know they are involved in an attack (and thus could provide evidence of the attack to the authorities and/or the media), is the best single measure of attack difficulty; as already discussed, we have concluded that the more people an attacker is forced to involve in his attack, the more likely it is that one of the participants would reveal the attack's existence and foil the attack, perhaps sending attackers to jail. However, we are aware of a number of places where the methodology could provide us with questionable results.

By deciding to concentrate on size of attack team, we mostly ignore the need for other resources when planning an attack. Thus, a software attack on DREs which makes use of steganography³⁴ to hide attack instruction files (*see* "DRE w/ VVPT Attack No.1a", discussed in greater detail, *infra* at pp. 62–65) is considered easier than an attack program delivered over a wireless network at the polling place (*see* discussion of wireless networks, *infra* at pp. 85–91). However, the former attack probably requires a much more technologically sophisticated attacker.

Another imperfection with this metric is that we do not have an easy way to represent how much choice the attacker has in finding members of his attack team.

Thus, with PCOS voting, we conclude that the cost of subverting a routine audit of ballots is roughly equal to the cost of intercepting ballot boxes in transit and substituting altered ballots (*see* discussion of PCOS attacks, *infra* at pp. 77–83). However, subverting the audit team requires getting a specific set of trusted people to cooperate with the attacker. By contrast, the attacker may be able to decide which precincts to tamper with based on which people he has already recruited for his attack.

In an attempt to address this concern, we considered looking at the number of "insiders" necessary to take part in each attack. Under this theory, getting five people to take part in a conspiracy to attack a voting system might not be particularly difficult. But getting five well-placed county election officials to take part in the attack would be (and should be labeled) the more difficult of the two attacks. Because, for the most part, the low-cost attacks we have identified do not necessarily involve well placed insiders (but could, for instance, involve one of many people with access to commercial off the shelf software ("COTS") during development

or at the vendor), we do not believe that using this metric would have substantially changed our analysis.³⁵

Finally, these attack team sizes do not always capture the logistical complexity of an attack. For example, an attack on VVPT machines involving tampering with the voting machine software and also replacing the paper records in transit requires the attacker to determine what votes were falsely produced by the voting machine and print replacement records in time to substitute them. While this is clearly possible, it raises a lot of operational difficulties – a single failed substitution leaves the possibility that the attack would be detected during the audit of ballots.

We have tried to keep these imperfections in mind when analyzing and discussing our least difficult attacks.

We suspect that much of the disagreement between voting officials and computer security experts in the last several years stems from a difference of opinion in prioritizing the difficulty of attacks. Election officials, with extensive experience in the logistics of handling tons of paper ballots, have little faith in paper and understand the kind of breakdowns in procedures that lead to traditional attacks like ballot box stuffing; in contrast, sophisticated attacks on computer voting systems appear very difficult to many of them. Computer security experts understand sophisticated attacks on computer systems, and recognize the availability of tools and expertise that makes these attacks practical to launch, but have no clear idea how they would manage the logistics of attacking a paper-based system. Looking at attack team size is one way to bridge this difference in perspective.

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURE SETS

The final step of our threat analysis is to measure the effect of certain countermeasures against the catalogued attacks. How much more difficult would the attacks become once the countermeasures are put into effect? How many more informed participants (if any) would be needed to counter or defeat these countermeasures?

Our process for examining the effectiveness of a countermeasure mirrors the process for determining the difficulty of an attack: we first asked whether the countermeasure would allow us to detect an attack with near certainty. If we agreed that the countermeasure would expose the attack, we identified the steps that would be necessary to circumvent or defeat the countermeasure. For each step to defeat the countermeasure, we determined the number of additional informed participants (if any) that an attacker would need to add to his team. As with the process for determining attack difficulty, the Brennan Center interviewed numerous election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned. When necessary, the values and steps for defeating the countermeasures were altered to reflect the input of election officials.

COUNTERMEASURES EXAMINED

BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The first set of countermeasures we looked at is the “Basic Set” of countermeasures. This Basic Set was derived from security survey responses³⁶ we received

from county election officials around the country, as well as additional interviews with more than a dozen current and former election officials. Within the Basic Set of countermeasures are the following procedures:

Inspection

The jurisdiction is not knowingly using any uncertified software that is subject to inspection by the Independent Testing Authority (often referred to as the “ITA”).³⁷

Physical Security for Machines

- Ballot boxes (to the extent they exist) are examined (to ensure they are empty) and locked by poll workers immediately before the polls are opened.
- Before and after being brought to the polls for Election Day, voting systems for each county are locked in a single room, in a county warehouse.
- The warehouse has perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards.
- Access to the warehouse is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.
- Some form of “tamper evident” seals are placed on machines before and after each election.
- The machines are transported to polling locations five to fifteen days before Election Day.

Chain of Custody/Physical Security of Election Day Records

- At close of the polls, vote tallies for each machine are totaled and compared with number of persons that have signed the poll books.
- A copy of totals for each machine is posted at each polling place on Election Night and taken home by poll workers to check against what is posted publicly at election headquarters, on the web, in the papers, or elsewhere.³⁸
- All audit information (*i.e.*, Event Logs, VVPT records, paper ballots, machine printouts of totals) that is not electronically transmitted as part of the unofficial upload to the central election office, is delivered in official, sealed and hand-delivered information packets or boxes. All seals are numbered and tamper-evident.
- Transportation of information packets is completed by two election officials representing opposing parties who have been instructed to remain in joint custody of the information packets or boxes from the moment it leaves the precinct to the moment it arrives at the county election center.

- Each polling place sends its information packets or boxes to the county election center separately, rather than having one truck or person pick up this data from multiple polling locations.
- Once the sealed information packets or boxes have reached the county election center, they are logged. Numbers on the seals are checked to ensure that they have not been replaced. Any broken or replaced seals are logged. Intact seals are left intact.
- After the packets and/or boxes have been logged, they are provided with physical security precautions at least as great as those listed for voting machines, above. Specifically, for Pennasota, we have assumed the room in which the packets are stored have perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards and county police officers; and access to the room is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.

Testing³⁹

- An Independent Testing Authority has certified the model of voting machine used in the polling place.
- Acceptance Testing⁴⁰ is performed on machines at time, or soon after they are received by County.
- Pre-election Logic and Accuracy⁴¹ testing is performed by the relevant election official.
- Prior to opening the polls, every voting machine and vote tabulation system is checked to see that it is still configured for the correct election, including the correct precinct, ballot style, and other applicable details.

REGIMEN FOR AUTOMATIC ROUTINE AUDIT PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES.

The second set of countermeasures is the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit Plus Basic Set of Countermeasures.

Some form of routine auditing of voter-verified paper records occurs in 12 states, to test the accuracy of electronic voting machines. They generally require between 1 and 10% of all precinct voting machines to be audited after each election. ⁴²

Jurisdictions can implement this set of countermeasures only if their voting systems produce some sort of voter-verified paper record of each vote. This could be in the form of a paper ballot, in the case of PCOS, or a voter-verified paper trail (“VVPT”), in the case of DREs.

We have assumed that jurisdictions take the following steps when conducting an Automatic Routine Audit (when referring to this set of assumptions “Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit”):

The Audit

- Leaders of the major parties in each county are responsible for selecting a sufficient number of audit-team members to be used in that county.⁴³
- Using a highly transparent random selection mechanism (*see* point ii, below), the voter-verified paper records for between a small percentage of all voting machines in the State are selected for auditing.
- Using a transparent random selection method, auditors are assigned to the selected machines (two or three people, with representatives of each major political party, would comprise each audit team).
- The selection of voting machines, and the assignment of auditors to machines, occurs immediately before the audits take place. The audits take place as soon after polls close as possible – for example, at 9 a.m. the morning after polls close.
- Using a transparent random selection method, county police officers, security personnel and the video monitor assigned to guard the voter-verified records are chosen from a large pool of on-duty officers and employees on election night.
- The auditors are provided the machine tallies and are able to see that the county tally reflects the sums of the machine tallies before the start of the inspection of the paper.
- The audit would include a tally of spoiled ballots (in the case of VVPT, the number of cancellations recorded), overvotes, and undervotes.

Transparent Random Selection Process

In this report, we have assumed that random auditing procedures are in place for both the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit and Regimen for Parallel Testing. We have further assumed procedures to prevent a single, corrupt person from being able to fix the results. This implies a kind of transparent and public random procedure.

For the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit there are at least two places where transparent, random selection processes are important: in the selection of precincts to audit, and in the assignment of auditors to the precincts they will be auditing.

Good election security can employ Transparent Random Selection in other places with good effect:

- the selection of parallel testers from a pool of qualified individuals.
- the assignment of police and other security professionals from on-duty lists, to monitor key materials, for example, the VVPT records between the time that they arrive at election central and the time of the completion of the ARA.

If a selection process for auditing is to be trustworthy and trusted, ideally:

- The whole process will be publicly observable or videotaped;⁴⁴
- The random selection will be publicly verifiable, *i.e.*, anyone observing will be able to verify that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number selected is not under the control of any small number of people); and
- The process will be simple and practical within the context of current election practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on election officials.

There are a number of ways that election officials can ensure some kind of transparent randomness. One way would be to use a state lottery machine to select precincts or polling places for auditing. We have included two potential examples of transparent random selection processes in Appendix F. These apply to the Regimen for Parallel Testing as well.

REGIMEN FOR PARALLEL TESTING PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The final set of countermeasures we have examined is “Parallel Testing” plus the Basic Set of countermeasures. Parallel Testing, also known as election-day testing, involves selecting voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible during the period that votes are being cast.

Parallel Testing

In developing our set of assumptions for Parallel Testing, we relied heavily upon interviews with Jocelyn Whitney, Project Manager for Parallel Testing in the State of California, and conclusions drawn from this Report.⁴⁵ In our analysis, we assume that the following procedures would be included in the Parallel Testing regimen (when referring to this regimen “Regimen for Parallel Testing”) that we evaluate:

- At least two of each DRE model (meaning both vendor and model) would be selected for Parallel Testing;
- At least two DREs from each of the three largest counties would be parallel tested;
- Counties to be parallel tested would be chosen by the Secretary of State in a transparent and random manner.
- Counties would be notified as late as possible that machines from one of their precincts would be selected for Parallel Testing;⁴⁶
- Precincts would be selected through a transparent random mechanism;
- A video camera would record testing;
- For each test, there would be one tester and one observer;

- Parallel Testing would occur at the polling place;
- The script for Parallel Testing would be generated in a way that mimics voter behavior and voting patterns for the polling place;
- At the end of the Parallel Testing, the tester and observer would reconcile vote totals in the script with vote totals reported on the machine.

Transparent Random Selection Process

We further assume that the same type of transparent random selection process that would be used for the Regimen for Automatic Routine Audit would also be employed for the Regimen for Parallel Testing to determine which machines would be subjected to testing on Election Day.

APPENDIX C

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY METRICS CONSIDERED

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The decision to use the number of informed participants as the metric for attack level difficulty came after considering several other potential metrics. One of the first metrics we considered was the dollar cost of attacks. This metric makes sense when looking at attacks that seek financial gain – for instance, misappropriating corporate funds. It is not rational to spend \$100,000 on the misappropriation of corporate funds if the total value of those funds is \$90,000. Ultimately, we rejected this metric as the basis for our analysis because the dollar cost of the attacks we considered were dwarfed by both (1) current federal and state budgets, and (2) the amounts currently spent legally in state and federal political campaigns.

Time of Attack

The relative security of safes and other safety measures are often rated in terms of “time to defeat.” This was rejected as metric of difficulty because it did not seem relevant to voting systems. Attackers breaking into a house are concerned with the amount of time it might take to complete their robbery because the homeowners or police might show up. With regard to election fraud, many attackers may be willing to start months or years before an election if they believe they can control the outcome. As discussed *supra* at pp. 35–48, attackers may be confident that they can circumvent the independent testing authorities and other measures meant to identify attacks, so that the amount of time an attack takes becomes less relevant.

Appendix 4
Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group

The Honorable Todd Rokita

Indiana Secretary of State

Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers

Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State

Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez

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Barbara Arnwine

Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

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Robert Bauer

Chair of the Political Law Practice at the law firm of Perkins Coie, District of Columbia

National Counsel for Voter Protection, Democratic National Committee

Benjamin L. Ginsberg

Partner, Patton Boggs LLP

Counsel to national Republican campaign committees and Republican candidates

Mark (Thor) Hearne II

Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St Louis, Missouri

National Counsel to the American Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg

Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S.

Department of Justice

EAC Invited Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto

Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

- ⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R
- ⁱⁱ The MyVote1 Project Final Report, Fels Institute of Government, University of Pennsylvania, November 1, 2005, Pg. 12
- ⁱⁱⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R, p. 4. This same report criticizes some of the procedures the Section used for these systems and urged the Department to improve upon them in time for the 2004 presidential election. No follow-up report has been done since that time to the best of our knowledge.
- ^{iv} "Department Of Justice To Hold Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium," U.S. Department of Justice press release, August 2, 2005
- ^v Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United States Federal Law," IFES Political Finance White Paper Series, 2006, p. 29
- ^{vi} Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, Jr., Voting Rights Act Reauthorization: Research-Based Recommendations to Improve Voting Access, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2006, p. 29

DRAFT

EAC REPORT ON VOTING FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun this, phase one, of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In this phase of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in the United States.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are topics that the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

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EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct that type of extensive research, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang,¹ who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic and the need to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged with (1) researching the current state of information on the topic of voting fraud and voter intimidation; (2) developing a uniform definition of voting

¹ Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix "1".

fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) proposing recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

The Honorable Todd Rokita
Indiana Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board and the
Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of
the Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez
Guadalupe County Elections
Administrator, Texas

Barbara Arnwine
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights under Law
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

Benjamin L. Ginsberg
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP
Counsel to National Republican
Campaign Committees and Republican
candidates

Robert Bauer
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the
law firm of Perkins Coie, District of
Columbia
National Counsel for Voter Protection,
Democratic National Committee

Mark (Thor) Hearne II
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St
Louis, Missouri
National Counsel to the American
Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief,
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Department of Justice

Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S.
Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and voter intimidation as well as summaries of the interviews that they conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.

EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and voter intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix “2”:

Articles and Reports

- People for the American Way and the NAACP, “The Long Shadow of Jim Crow,” December 6, 2004.
- Laughlin McDonald, “The New Poll Tax,” *The American Prospect* vol. 13 no. 23, December 30, 2002.
- Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, “An Evaluation: Voter Registration Elections Board” Report 05-12, September, 2005.
- Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Attorney’s Office “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” May 10, 2005.
- National Commission on Federal Election Reform, “Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” Center for Democracy and Election Management, American University, September 2005.
- The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton, Commissioner and Law Professor at George Washington University School of Law “Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform,” September 19, 2005.

- Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, “Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?” A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.
- Alec Ewald, “A Crazy Quilt of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law,” The Sentencing Project, November 2005.
- American Center for Voting Rights “Vote Fraud, Intimidation and Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election,” August 2, 2005.
- The Advancement Project, “America’s Modern Poll Tax: How Structural Disenfranchisement Erodes Democracy” November 7, 2001
- The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald “Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voting fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General,” The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, December 2005.
- Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."
- Craig Donsanto, "The Federal Crime of Election Fraud," Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice, prepared for Democracy.Ru, n.d., at http://www.democracy.ru/english/library/international/eng_1999-11.html
- People for the American Way, Election Protection 2004, Election Protection Coalition, at <http://www.electionprotection2004.org/edaynews.htm>
- Craig Donsanto, "Prosecution of Electoral Fraud under United State Federal Law," *IFES Political Finance White Paper Series*, IFES, 2006.

- General Accounting Office, "Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote," Report to Congressional Requesters, September 2005.
- Lori Minnite and David Callahan, "Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud," Demos: A Network of Ideas and Action, 2003.
- People for the American Way, NAACP, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," December 2004.

Books

- John Fund, *Stealing Elections: How Voting fraud Threatens Our Democracy*, Encounter Books, 2004.
- Andrew Gumbel, *Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in American*, Nation Books, 2005.
- Tracy Campbell, *Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005.
- David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson, *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House: Foolhardiness, Folly, and Fraud in the Presidential Elections, from Andrew Jackson to George W. Bush*, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004.
- Mark Crispin Miller, *Fooled Again*, Basic Books, 2005.

During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or voter intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 Presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as

“Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement concerning what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, including legal practices that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. For example, a number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

Wade Henderson
Executive Director,
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser
Deputy Director,
Democracy Program, The Brennan
Center

William Groth
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana
voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite
Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley
ACLU Voting Rights Project

Pat Rogers
Attorney, New Mexico

Nina Perales
Counsel,
Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund

Rebecca Vigil-Giron
Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson
Executive Director,
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobhere
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson
Rice University

Tracey Campbell

Author, *Deliver the Vote*

Douglas Webber

Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

Heather Dawn Thompson

Director of Government Relations,
National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky

Assistant General Counsel,
American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette

Executive Director,
American Center for Voting Rights

Harry Van Sickle

Commissioner of Elections,
Pennsylvania

Tony Sirvello

Executive Director
International Association of Clerks,
Recorders, Election Officials and
Treasurers

Joseph Sandler

Counsel
Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz

Executive Director
New York City Board of Elections

Sharon Priest

Former Secretary of State, Arkansas

Kevin Kennedy

Executive Director
State Board of Elections, Wisconsin

Evelyn Stratton

Justice
Supreme Court of Ohio

Joseph Rich

Former Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

Craig Donsanto

Director, Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice

John Tanner

Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it is the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws,

voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state's attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix "3".

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix "4".

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,

- non-citizens voting,
- vote buying,
- deceptive practices, and
- fraud by election officials.

While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations of voting fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media reports were enlightening as to the pervasiveness of complaints of fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a “battleground” or “swing” state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of voting fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges and prosecutions of voting fraud and intimidation throughout the country.

DEFINITION OF ELECTION CRIMES

From our study of available information on voting fraud and voter intimidation, we have learned that these terms mean many things to many different people. These terms are used casually to refer to anything from vote buying to refusing to register a voter to falsifying voter registration applications. Upon further inspection, however, it is apparent that there is no common understanding or agreement of what constitutes “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation.” Some think of voting fraud and voter intimidation only as criminal acts, while others include actions that may constitute civil wrongs, civil rights violations, and even legal and appropriate activities. To arrive at a common definition and list of activities that can be studied, EAC assessed the appropriateness of the terminology that is currently in use and applied certain factors to limit the scope and reach of what can and will be studied by EAC in the future.

New Terminology

The phrase “voting fraud” is really a misnomer for a concept that is much broader. “Fraud” is a concept that connotes an intentional act of deception, which may constitute either a criminal act or civil tort depending upon the willfulness of the act.

Fraud, n. 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime.

Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 685.

“Voting” is the act of casting votes to decide an issue or contest. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1608. Using these terms to form a definition of “voting fraud,” it means fraudulent or deceptive acts committed to influence the act of voting. Thus, a voter who intentionally impersonates another registered voter and attempts to

vote for that person would be committing “voting fraud.” Similarly, a person who knowingly provides false information to a voter about the location of the voter’s polling place commits fraud on the voter.

The phrase “voting fraud” does not capture a myriad of other criminal acts that are related to elections which are not related to the act of voting and/or do not involve an act of deception. For example, “voting fraud” does not capture actions or willful inaction in the voter registration process. When an election official willfully and knowingly refuses to register to vote a legally eligible person it is a crime. This is a crime that involves neither the act of voting nor an act of deception.

To further complicate matters, the phrases “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation” are used to refer to actions or inactions that are criminal as well as those that are potentially civil wrongs and even those that are legal. Obviously, criminal acts and civil wrongs are pursued in a very different manner. Criminal acts are prosecuted by the local, state or federal government. Generally, civil wrongs are prosecuted by the individual who believes that they were harmed. In some cases, when civil rights are involved, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice may become involved.

The goal of this study was to develop a common definition of what is generically referred to as “voting fraud” and “voter intimidation” that would serve as the basis for a future, comprehensive study of the existence of these problems. In order to meet that goal, we recognize that the current terminology does not accurately represent the spectrum of activities that we desire to study. Furthermore, we recognize that the resources, both financial and human capital, needed to study allegations and prosecutions of criminal acts, suits involving civil torts, and allegations of potential voter suppression through the use of legal election processes are well beyond the resources available to EAC. As such, EAC has defined “election crimes,” a phrase that captures all crimes related to the voter registration and voting processes.

The Definition of an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

Election crimes are intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act.

Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other groups and individuals do not have such duties.

The victim of an election crime can be a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public in general. Election crimes can occur during any stage of the election process, including but not limited to qualification of candidates; voter registration; campaigning; voting system preparation and programming; voting either early, absentee, or on election day; vote tabulation; recounts; and recalls.

The following are examples of activities that may constitute election crimes. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is representative of what states and the federal government consider criminal activity related to elections.

Acts of Deception

- Knowingly causing to be mailed or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information about the voter's precinct or polling place, the date and time of the election or a candidate;
- Possessing an official ballot outside the voting location, unless the person is an election official or other person authorized by law or local ordinance to possess a ballot outside of the polling location;
- Making or knowingly possessing a counterfeit of an official election ballot;
- Signing a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office;
- Knowingly signing more than once for the proposition, question, or candidate in one election;
- Signing a petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified voter.
- Voting or attempting to vote in the name of another person;
- Voting or attempting to vote more than once during the same election;
- Intentionally making a false affidavit, swearing falsely, or falsely affirming under an oath required by a statute regarding their voting status, including when registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot or presenting to vote in person;
- Registering to vote without being entitled to register;
- Knowingly making a materially false statement on an application for voter registration or re-registration; and
- Voting or attempting to vote in an election after being disqualified or when the person knows that he/she is not eligible to vote.

Acts of Coercion

- Using, threatening to use, or causing to be used force, coercion, violence, restraint, or inflicting, threatening to inflict, or causing to be inflicted damage harm, or loss, upon or against another person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting or to register or refrain from registering to vote;
- Knowingly paying, offering to pay, or causing to be paid money or other thing of value to a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate or for or against an election proposition or question;

- Knowingly soliciting or encouraging a person who is not qualified to vote in an election;
- Knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds, or engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voter from voting or to delay the process of voting;
- As an employer, attempting by coercion, intimidation, threats to discharge or to lessen the remuneration of an employee, to influence his/her vote in any election, or who requires or demands an examination or inspection by himself/herself or another of an employee’s ballot;
- Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition proposing an initiative;
- Inducing or attempting to induce an election official to fail in the official’s duty by force, threat, intimidation, or offers of reward;
- Directly or through any other person advancing, paying, soliciting, or receiving or causing to be advanced, paid, solicited, or received, any money or other valuable consideration to or for the use of any person in order to induce a person not to become or to withdraw as a candidate for public office; and
- Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or other thing of value in exchange for registering to vote.

Acts of Damage or Destruction

- Destroying completed voter registration applications;
- Removing or destroying any of the supplies or other conveniences placed in the voting booths or compartments;
- Removing, tearing down, or defacing election materials, instructions or ballots;
- Fraudulently altering or changing the vote of any elector, by which such elector is prevented from voting as the person intended;
- Knowingly removing, altering, defacing or covering any political sign of any candidate for public office for a prescribed period prior to and following the election;
- Intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing to be changed an official election document including ballots, tallies, and returns; and
- Intentionally delaying, attempting to delay, or causing to be delayed the sending of certificate, register, ballots, or other materials whether original or duplicate, required to be sent by jurisdictional law.

Failure or Refusal to Act

- Intentionally failing to perform an election duty, or knowingly committing an unauthorized act with the intent to effect the election;
- Knowingly permitting, making, or attempting to make a false count of election returns;
- Intentionally concealing, withholding, or destroying election returns or attempts to do so;

- Marking a ballot by folding or physically altering the ballot so as to recognize the ballot at a later time;
- Attempting to learn or actually and unlawfully learning how a voter marked a ballot;
- Distributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent;
- Knowingly refusing to register a person who is entitled to register under the rules of that jurisdiction;
- Knowingly removing the eligibility status of a voter who is eligible to vote; and
- Knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to cast his/her ballot.

What is not an Election Crime for Purposes of this Study

There are some actions or inactions that may constitute crimes or civil wrongs that we do not include in our definition of “election crimes.” All criminal or civil violations related to campaign finance contribution limitations, prohibitions, and reporting either at the state or federal level are not “election crimes” for purposes of this study and any future study conducted by EAC. Similarly, criminal acts that are unrelated to elections, voting, or voter registration are not “election crimes,” even when those offenses occur in a polling place, voter registration office, or a candidate’s office or appearance. For example, an assault or battery that results from a fight in a polling place or at a candidate’s office is not an election crime. Similarly, violations of ethical provisions such as the Hatch Act are not “election crimes,” and actions that do not rise to the level of criminal activity, such as a misdemeanor, relative felony or felony, are not “election crimes.”

RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO STUDY ELECTION CRIMES

As a part of its study, EAC sought recommendations on ways that EAC can research the existence of election crimes. EAC consultants, the working groups and some of the persons interviewed as a part of this study provided the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Conduct More Interviews

Future activity in this area should include conducting additional interviews. In particular, more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and political parties should be interviewed. It would also be especially beneficial to talk to law enforcement officials, specifically federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”) and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

Recommendation 2: Follow Up on Media Research

The media search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by EAC consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contained allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, some of the articles contained information about investigations into such

activities or even charges brought. Additional media research should be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

Recommendation 3: Follow Up on Allegations Found in Literature Review

Many of the allegations made in the reports and books that were analyzed and summarized by EAC consultants were not substantiated and were certainly limited by the date of publication of those pieces. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Further research should include follow up on the allegations discovered in the literature review.

Recommendation 4: Review Complaints Filed With “MyVote1” Voter Hotline

During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a toll-free voter hotline that voters could call for poll locations, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in more than 200,000 calls received and more than 56,000 recorded complaints.

Further research should be conducted using the MyVote1 data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 56,000 complaints may provide insight into the problems voters may have experienced, especially issues regarding intimidation or suppression.

Recommendation 5: Further Review of Complaints Filed With U.S. Department of Justice

According to a recent GAO report, the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety of ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation. Attempts should be made to obtain relevant data, including the telephone logs of complaints and information from the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system. Further research should also include a review and analysis of the DOJ/OPM observer and “monitor field reports” from Election Day.

Recommendation 6: Review Reports Filed By District Election Officers

Further research should include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voting fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.

Recommendation 7: Attend Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium

Further activity in this area should include attending the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. At this conference, prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices obtain annual training on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following: how District Election Officers are trained; how information about previous election and voting issues is presented; and how the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

Recommendation 8: Conduct Statistical Research

EAC should measure voting fraud and intimidation using interviews, focus groups, and a survey and statistical analysis of the results of these efforts. The sample should be based on the following factors:

- Ten locations that are geographically and demographically diverse where there have been many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;
- Ten locations (geographically and demographically diverse) that have not had many reports of fraud and/or intimidation;

EAC should also conduct a survey of elections officials, district attorneys, and district election officers. The survey sample should be large in order to be able to get the necessary subsets, and it must include a random set of counties where there have and have not been a large number of allegations.

Recommendation 9: Explore Improvements to Federal Law

Future researchers should review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat.

Recommendation 10: Use Observers to Collect Data on Election Day

Use observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls on Election Day. There may be some limitations to the ability to conduct this type of research, including difficulty gaining access to polling places for the purposes of observation, and concerns regarding how the observers themselves may inadvertently or deliberately influence the occurrence of election crimes.

Recommendation 11: Study Absentee Ballot Fraud

Because absentee ballot fraud constitutes a large portion of election crimes, a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud should be conducted. Researchers should look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing fraud when absentee ballots are used.

Recommendation 12: Use Risk Analysis Methodology to Study Fraud

Conduct an analysis of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit. Researchers will use that risk analysis to rank the types of fraud based on the “ease of commission” and the impact of the fraud.

Recommendation 13: Conduct Research Using Database Comparisons

Researchers should compare information on databases to determine whether the voter rolls contain deceased persons and felons. In addition, the voter rolls can then be compared with the list of persons who voted to determine whether a vote was recorded by someone who is deceased or if felons are noted as having voted.

Recommendation 14: Conduct a Study of Deceptive Practices

The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers and phone calls with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, such as the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices. These logs should be reviewed and analyzed to see how and where such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.

Recommendation 15: Study Use of HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure as Vehicle for Measuring Fraud and Intimidation

EAC should study the extent to which states are utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.

Recommendation 16: Examine the Use of Special Election Courts

Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts should be established to handle fraud and intimidation complaints before, during, and after Election Day. Pennsylvania employs such a system and could investigate how well that system is working.

Accepted Recommendations

There has never been a comprehensive, national study that gathered data regarding all claims, charges, and prosecutions of voting crimes. EAC feels that a comprehensive study is the most important research that it can offer the election community and the public. As such, EAC has adopted all or a part of six of the 16 recommendations made by EAC consultants and the working group.

While several of the other recommendations could be used to obtain more anecdotal information regarding election crimes, EAC believes that what is needed is a comprehensive survey and study of the information available from investigatory agencies, prosecutorial bodies and courts on the number and types of complaints, charges and prosecutions of election crimes. Additional media reviews, additional interviews and the use of observers to collect information from voters on Election Day will only serve to continue the use of anecdotal data to report on election crimes. Hard data on complaints, charges and prosecutions exists and we should gather and use that data, rather than rely on the perceptions of the media or the members of the public as to what might be fraud or intimidation.

Some of the recommendations are beyond the scope of the current study. While election courts may be a reasonable conclusion to reach after we determine the volume and type of election crimes being reported, charged or prosecuted, it is premature to embark on an analysis of that solution without more information. Last, some of the recommendations do not support a comprehensive study of election crimes. While a risk analysis might be appropriate in a smaller scale study, EAC desires to conduct a broader survey to avoid the existing problem of anecdotal and limited scope of information.

In order to further its goal of developing a comprehensive data set regarding election crimes and the laws and procedures used to identify and prosecute them, EAC intends to engage in the following research activities in studying the existence and enforcement of election crimes:

Survey Chief Election Officers Regarding Administrative Complaints

Likely sources of complaints concerning election crimes are the administrative complaint processes that states were required to establish to comply with Section 402 of HAVA. These complaint procedures were required to be in place prior to a state receiving any funds under HAVA. Citizens are permitted to file complaints alleging violations of HAVA Title III provisions under these procedures with the state's chief election official. Those complaints must be resolved within 60 days. The procedures also allow for alternative dispute resolution of claims. Some states have expanded this process to include complaints of other violations, such as election crimes.

In order to determine how many of these complaints allege the commission of election crimes, EAC will survey the states' chief election officers regarding complaints that have been filed, investigated, and resolved since January 1, 2004. EAC will use the definition

of election crimes provided above in this report in its survey so that data regarding a uniform set of offenses will be collected.

Survey State Election Crime Investigation Units Regarding Complaints Filed and Referred

Several chief state election officials have developed investigation units focused on receiving, investigating, and referring complaints of election crimes. These units were established to bolster the abilities of state and local law enforcement to investigate allegations of election crimes. California, New York and Florida are just three examples of states that have these types of units.

EAC will use a survey instrument to gather information on the numbers and types of complaints that have been received by, investigated, and ultimately referred to local or state law enforcement by election crime investigation units since January 1, 2004. These data will help us understand the pervasiveness of perceived fraud, as well as the number of claims that state election officials felt were meritorious of being referred to local and state law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for further action.

Survey Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Agencies Regarding Complaints and Charge of Voting Crimes

While voters, candidates and citizens may call national hotlines or the news media to report allegations of election crimes, it is those complaints that are made to law enforcement that can be investigated and ultimately prosecuted. Thus, it is critical to the study of election crimes to obtain statistics regarding the number and types of complaints that are made to law enforcement, how many of those complaints result in the perpetrator being charged or indicted, and how many of those charges or indictments result in pleas or convictions.

Thus, EAC will survey law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies at the local, state and federal level to determine the number and types of complaints, charges or indictments, and pleas or convictions of election crimes since January 1, 2004. In addition, EAC will seek to obtain an understanding of why some complaints are not charged or indicted and why some charges or indictments are not prosecuted.

Analyze Survey Data in Light of State Laws and Procedures

Once a reliable data set concerning the existence and enforcement of election crimes is assembled, a real analysis of the effectiveness of fraud prevention measures can be conducted. For example, data can be analyzed to determine if criminal activities related to elections are isolated to certain areas or regions of the country. Data collected from the election official surveys can be compared to the data regarding complaints, charges and prosecutions gathered from the respective law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies in each jurisdiction. The effect and/or effectiveness of provisions such as voter identification laws and challenger provisions can be assessed based on hard data from

areas where these laws exist. Last, analyses such as the effectiveness of enforcement can be conducted in light of the resources available to the effort.

CONCLUSION

Election crimes are nothing new to our election process. The pervasiveness of these crimes and the fervor with which they have been enforced has created a great deal of debate among academics, election officials, and voters. Past studies of these issues have been limited in scope and some have been riddled with bias. These are issues that deserve comprehensive and nonpartisan review. EAC, through its clearinghouse role, will collect and analyze data on election crimes throughout the country. These data not only will tell us what types of election crimes are committed and where fraud exists, but also inform us of what factors impact the existence, prevention, and prosecution of election crimes.

TAMARLY
Comments

EAC REPORT ON VOTING FRAUD AND VOTER INTIMIDATION STUDY

~~voter~~ INTRODUCTION

Voting fraud and ~~intimidation~~ voter intimidation are phrases familiar to many voting-aged Americans. However, they mean different things to different people. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are phrases used to refer to crimes, civil rights violations, and, at times, even the correct application of state or federal laws to the voting process. Past study of these topics has been as varied as its perceived meaning. In an effort to help understand the realities of voting fraud and voter intimidation in our elections, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has begun ~~this phase one~~ of a comprehensive study on election crimes. In ~~this~~ phase ^{one} of its examination, EAC has developed a definition of election crimes and adopted some research methodology on how to assess the existence and enforcement of election crimes in ~~this country~~ the United States

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EAC STUDY

Section 241 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) calls on the EAC to research and study various issues related to the administration of elections. During Fiscal Year 2006, EAC began projects to research several of the listed topics. These topics for research were chosen in consultation with the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. Voting fraud and voter intimidation are topics that the EAC as well as its advisory boards felt were important to study to help improve the administration of elections for federal office.

EAC began this study with the intention of identifying a common understanding of voting fraud and voter intimidation and devising a plan for a comprehensive study of these issues. This study was not intended to be a comprehensive review of existing voting fraud and voter intimidation actions, laws, or prosecutions. To conduct ~~that type of extensive research~~ ^{later} ~~compreh.~~, a basic understanding had to first be established regarding what is commonly referred to as voting fraud and voter intimidation. Once that understanding was reached, a definition had to be crafted to refine and in some cases limit the scope of what reasonably can be researched and studied as evidence of voting fraud and voter intimidation. That definition will serve as the basis for recommending a plan for a comprehensive study of the area.

To accomplish these tasks, EAC employed two consultants, Job Serebrov and Tova Wang,¹ who worked with EAC staff and interns to conduct the research that forms the basis of this report. The consultants were chosen based upon their experience with the topic ~~and~~ ^{the need} to assure a bipartisan representation in this study. The consultants and EAC staff were charged ~~to~~ ^{ing} (1) research ~~the~~ ^{with} the current state of information on the topic of voting

¹ Biographies for Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, the two consultants hired by EAC, are attached as Appendix "1".

fraud and voter intimidation; (2) develop a uniform definition of voting fraud and voter intimidation; and (3) propose recommended strategies for researching this subject.

EAC consultants reviewed existing studies, articles, reports and case law on voting fraud and intimidation and conducted interviews with experts in the field. EAC consultants and staff then presented their initial findings to a working group that provided feedback. The working group participants were:

The Honorable Todd Rokita
Indiana Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board and the
Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers
Georgia Director of Elections, Office of
the Secretary of State
Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez
Guadalupe County Elections
Administrator, Texas

Barbara Arnwine
Executive Director, Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights under Law
Leader of Election Protection Coalition

Benjamin L. Ginsberg
Partner, Patton Boggs LLP
Counsel to National Republican
Campaign Committees and Republican
candidates

Robert Bauer
Chair of the Political Law Practice at the
law firm of Perkins Coie, District of
Columbia
National Counsel for Voter Protection,
Democratic National Committee

Mark (Thor) Hearne II
Partner-Member, Lathrop & Gage, St
Louis, Missouri
National Counsel to the American
Center for Voting Rights

Barry Weinberg
Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief,
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Department of Justice

Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto
Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S.
Department of Justice

Throughout the process, EAC staff assisted the consultants by providing statutes and cases on this subject as well as supervision on the direction, scope and product of this research.

The consultants drafted a report for EAC that included their summaries of relevant cases, studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, as well as summaries of the interviews ~~that they~~ conducted. The draft report also provided a definition of voting fraud and intimidation and made certain recommendations developed by the consultants or by the working group on how to pursue further study of this subject. This document was vetted and edited by EAC staff to produce this final report.

the consultants

EXISTING INFORMATION ABOUT FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

To begin our study of voting fraud and voter intimidation, EAC consultants reviewed the current body of information on voting fraud and voter intimidation. The information available about these issues comes largely from a very limited body of reports, articles, and books. There are volumes of case law and statutes in the various states that also impact our understanding of what actions or inactions are legally considered fraud or intimidation. Last, there is anecdotal information available through media reports and interviews with persons who have administered elections, prosecuted fraud, and studied these problems. All of these resources were used by EAC consultants to provide an introductory look at the available knowledge of voting fraud and voter intimidation.

Reports and Studies of Voting fraud and Intimidation

Over the years, there have been a number of studies conducted and reports published about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC reviewed many of these studies and reports to develop a base-line understanding of the information that is currently available about voting fraud and voter intimidation. EAC consultants reviewed the following articles, reports and books, summaries of which are available in Appendix “2”:

Articles and Reports

- People for the American Way and the NAACP, “The Long Shadow of Jim Crow,” December 6, 2004.
- Laughlin McDonald, "The New Poll Tax," *The American Prospect* vol. 13 no. 23, December 30, 2002.
- Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, “An Evaluation: Voter Registration Elections Board” Report 05-12, September, 2005.
- Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Attorney’s Office “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” May 10, 2005.
- National Commission on Federal Election Reform, “Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” Center for Democracy and Election Management, American University, September 2005.
- The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton, Commissioner and Law Professor at George Washington University School of Law “Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform,” September 19, 2005.

- Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, "Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?" A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.
- Alec Ewald, "A Crazy Quilt of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law," The Sentencing Project, November 2005.
- American Center for Voting Rights "Vote Fraud, Intimidation and Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election," August 2, 2005.
- The Advancement Project, "America's Modern Poll Tax: How Structural Disenfranchisement Erodes Democracy" November 7, 2001
- The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald "Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voting fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General," The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, December 2005.
- Democratic National Committee, "Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio," DNC Services Corporation, 2005
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2003."
- Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2004."
- Craig Donsanto, "The Federal Crime of Election Fraud," Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice, prepared for Democracy.Ru, n.d., at http://www.democracy.ru/english/library/international/eng_1999-11.html
- People for the American Way, Election Protection 2004, Election Protection Coalition, at <http://www.electionprotection2004.org/edaynews.htm>
- Craig Donsanto, "Prosecution of Electoral Fraud under United State Federal Law," *IFES Political Finance White Paper Series*, IFES, 2006.

- General Accounting Office, "Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote," Report to Congressional Requesters, September 2005.
- Lori Minnite and David Callahan, "Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud," Demos: A Network of Ideas and Action, 2003.
- People for the American Way, NAACP, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," December 2004.

Books

- John Fund, *Stealing Elections: How Voting fraud Threatens Our Democracy*, Encounter Books, 2004.
- Andrew Gumbel, *Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in American*, Nation Books, 2005.
- Tracy Campbell, *Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005.
- David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson, *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House: Foolhardiness, Folly, and Fraud in the Presidential Elections, from Andrew Jackson to George W. Bush*, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004.
- Mark Crispin Miller, *Fooled Again*, Basic Books, 2005.

During our review of these documents, we learned a great deal about the type of research that has been conducted in the past concerning voting fraud and voter intimidation. None of the studies or reports was based on a comprehensive, nationwide study, survey or review of all allegations, prosecutions or convictions of state or federal crimes related to voting fraud or voter intimidation in the United States. Most reports focused on a limited number of case studies or instances of alleged voting fraud or voter intimidation. For example, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," a report produced by the People for the American Way, focused exclusively on citizen reports of fraud or intimidation to the Election Protection program during the 2004 Presidential election. Similarly, reports produced annually by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Division, deal exclusively with crimes reported to and prosecuted by the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice through the Public Integrity Section.

It is also apparent from a review of these articles and books that there is no consensus on the pervasiveness of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Some reports, such as

“Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,” suggest that there is little or no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting. This conflicts directly with other reports, such as the “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” produced by the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office. That report cited evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in the name of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting using a name believed to be fake.

Voter intimidation is also a topic of some debate because there is little agreement ^{concerning} what constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Some studies and reports cover only intimidation that involves physical or financial threats, while others cover non-criminal intimidation, ~~even~~ ^{including} legal practices, that allegedly cause vote suppression.

One point of agreement is that absentee voting and voter registration by nongovernmental groups create opportunities for fraud. ^{For example,} a number of studies cited circumstances in which voter registration drives have falsified voter registration applications or have destroyed voter registration applications of persons affiliated with a certain political party. Others conclude that paying persons per voter registration application creates the opportunity and perhaps the incentive for fraud.

Interviews with Experts

In addition to reviewing prior studies and reports on voting fraud and intimidation, EAC consultants interviewed a number of persons regarding their experiences and research of voting fraud and voter intimidation. Persons interviewed included:

Wade Henderson
Executive Director,
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser
Deputy Director,
Democracy Program, The Brennan
Center

William Groth
Attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana
voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite
Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley
ACLU Voting Rights Project

Pat Rogers
Attorney, New Mexico

Nina Perales
Counsel,
Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund

Rebecca Vigil-Giron
Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson
Executive Director,
State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobhere
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson
Rice University

Tracey Campbell

Author, *Deliver the Vote*

Douglas Webber

Assistant Attorney General, Indiana

Heather Dawn Thompson

Director of Government Relations,
National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky

Assistant General Counsel,
American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette

Executive Director,
American Center for Voting Rights

Harry Van Sickle

Commissioner of Elections,
Pennsylvania

Tony Sirvello

Executive Director
International Association of Clerks,
Recorders, Election Officials and
Treasurers

Joseph Sandler

Counsel
Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz

Executive Director
New York City Board of Elections

Sharon Priest

Former Secretary of State, Arkansas

Kevin Kennedy

Executive Director
State Board of Elections, Wisconsin

Evelyn Stratton

Justice
Supreme Court of Ohio

Joseph Rich

Former Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

Craig Donsanto

Director, Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice

John Tanner

Director
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

These interviews in large part confirmed the conclusions that were gleaned from the articles, reports and books that were analyzed. For example, the interviewees largely agreed that absentee balloting is subject to the greatest proportion of fraudulent acts, followed by vote buying and voter registration fraud. They similarly pointed to voter registration drives by nongovernmental groups as a source of fraud, particularly when the workers are paid per registration. Many asserted that impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it was the most likely type of fraud to be discovered, the stiff penalties associated with this type of fraud, and ~~that~~ it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.

Interviewees differed on what they believe constitutes actionable voter intimidation. Law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies tend to look to the criminal definitions of voter intimidation, which generally require some threat of physical or financial harm. On the other hand, voter rights advocates tended to point to activities such as challenger laws,

voter identification laws, polling place locations, and distribution of voting machines as activities that can constitute voter intimidation.

Those interviewed also expressed opinions on the enforcement of voting fraud and voter intimidation laws. States have varying authorities to enforce these laws. In some states, enforcement is left to the county or district attorney, and in others enforcement is managed by the state’s attorney general. Regardless, voting fraud and voter intimidation are difficult to prove and require resources and time that many local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies do not have. Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have more time and resources but have limited jurisdiction and can only prosecute election crimes perpetrated in elections with a federal candidate on the ballot or perpetrated by a public official under the color of law. Those interviewed differed on the effectiveness of the current system of enforcement. Some allege that prosecutions are not sufficiently aggressive. Others feel that the current laws are sufficient for prosecuting fraud and intimidation.

A summary of the each of the interviews conducted is attached as Appendix “3”.

Case Law and Statutes

Consultants reviewed more than 40,000 cases that were identified using a series of search terms related to voting fraud and voter intimidation. The majority of these cases came from courts of appeal. This is not surprising, since most cases that are publicly reported come from courts of appeal. Very few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.

Very few of the identified cases were applicable to this study. Of those that were applicable, no apparent thematic pattern emerged. However, it did seem that the greatest number of cases reported on fraud and intimidation have shifted from past patterns of stealing votes to present problems with voter registration, voter identification, the proper delivery and counting of absentee and overseas ballots, provisional voting, vote buying, and challenges to felon eligibility.

A listing of the cases reviewed in this study is attached as Appendix “4”.

Media Reports

EAC consultants reviewed thousands of media reports concerning a wide variety of potential voting fraud or voter intimidation, including:

- absentee ballot fraud,
- voter registration fraud,
- voter intimidation and suppression,
- deceased voters,
- multiple voting,
- felons voting,